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Dodging Antitrust Bullets in Patent Settlement Agreements:
Lessons Learned from the "Reverse Payment" Dilemma
A. Paul Heeringa *
I. INTRODUCTION
Settlement agreements in patent dispute cases have recently come
under intense antitrust fire.' These settlements commonly occur be-
tween business competitors, often include arguably anticompetitive
terms, and, as such, raise significant antitrust issues.2 Today's patent
lawyers face a challenge determining if their settlement agreements
can withstand antitrust scrutiny. The Sixth Circuit is seemingly at
odds with the Second and Eleventh Circuits as to whether such agree-
ments constitute antitrust violations and what legal analysis should be
employed during review.3 Moreover, there does not appear to be any
relief in sight since the Supreme Court has declined three opportuni-
* Associate of Schiff Hardin LLP (General Litigation and Intellectual Property Depart-
ments), Chicago, Illinois; J.D. 2005, DePaul University College of Law; B.A. (Political Science)
1997, University of Chicago. Admitted to Illinois Bar and Northern District of Illinois, 2006.
The author would like to specially thank Professor Richard Hoskins of the Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law for providing me with the idea for this Comment and for his invaluable
guidance in its early stages. Thanks also to Professor Rodney Blackman of the DePaul Univer-
sity College of Law for his patience and guidance during the drafting process and to my friends
and family for their constant support and encouragement.
1. See Richard E. Donovan, Antitrust Issues in Licensing, 2005 PATENT & HIGH TECHNOLOGY
LICENSING 391, 419 (2005).
2. See Herbert Hovenkamp, et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes,
87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1720 (2003). See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Settlement of
Intellectual Property Disputes, IP & ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AP-
PLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW §7, 7-3 (2007 Supplement) (hereinafter, "Hovenkamp
Treatise"). Professor Hovenkamp also notes that settlement agreements in IP cases "often take
the form of unrestricted or restricted licenses, which may or may not be exclusive..." and are
often "horizontal" (i.e., between actual or at least potential competitors) - both of which serve
to "raise significant antitrust issues." Hovenkamp Treatise at 7-3.
3. Most commentators to address this problem to date have analyzed it as a two-circuit split,
with the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits disagreeing as to whether the agreements at issue should be
deemed "per se illegal under the antitrust laws, and how such agreements should be analyzed."
Richard D. Chaves Mosier & Steven W. Ritcheson, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 497, 510-11 (2004). However, as discussed in Part III of this Comment, the landscape has
changed considerably today, which makes this two-circuit view a bit myopic. See infra notes 213-
238 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, this Comment operates under one basic assumption:
there is legitimate discrepancy between the courts as to the extent to which patent settlement
agreements warrant antitrust scrutiny.
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ties to clarify any divergence.4 Consequently, this issue will affect in-
tellectual property ("IP") practitioners for years to come because the
lack of guidance in this area will continue to cause a variety of ques-
tionably-reasoned decisions and a marked lack of predictability/con-
sistency when drafting patent settlement agreements.
Along these lines, the primary goals of this Comment are: (a) to
outline and explain the conflict among the courts as it stands today;
(b) to provide practical tips, in light of recent scholarship and case
law, for avoiding antitrust pitfalls when drafting/defending patent dis-
pute settlement agreements; and (c) to propose a position that the
Supreme Court should adopt.
To meet these broad goals, Part II of this Comment discusses back-
ground concerns, including the turbulent interaction between the two
applicable legal regimes - patent and antitrust law.5 This section also
describes the typical antitrust analytical framework that courts employ
when reviewing potentially anticompetitive activity.6 Part II further
describes the environment in which patent dispute settlements have
recently come before the courts - i.e., pharmaceutical "reverse pay-
ment" cases under the Hatch-Waxman Act - and how these cases
implicate patent settlement agreements beyond the drug context.7
Part II concludes by discussing how recent courts have varied widely
in their antitrust approaches to patent settlement agreements. 8 Then,
based on examined cases and commentators, Part III begins by com-
paring and contrasting the various holdings to illustrate the depth of
the problem, and then offers some practical tips on how to potentially
draft/defend patent settlement agreements to survive antitrust re-
view.9 Part III also offers a potential solution, discussing why the Su-
preme Court should adopt the Eleventh Circuit's analytical approach
- comparing the "exclusionary potential" of the patent against the
agreement - as its official test.10  Finally, Part IV discusses the im-
pact that continued ambiguity will have on the ability of patent settle-
ment agreements to weather antitrust challenges into the future,
paying special attention to recent appeals to the Supreme Court and
its thrice-denial of certiorari.11
4. See infra note 383 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 15-31 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 45-70 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 71-209 and accompanying text. See also Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2,
at 7-39.
9. See infra notes 213-355 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 356-400 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 383-400 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
This section will discuss the conflict between the two relevant legal
regimes - patent and antitrust law - to give an overview of the tur-
bulent environment in which IP practitioners must craft their settle-
ment agreements. 12 It will then discuss the typical antitrust analytical
framework courts employ when reviewing questionably anticompeti-
tive activity in general. 13 It concludes by discussing the pharmaceuti-
cal "reverse payment" cases under the Hatch-Waxman Act, both
generally and specifically, and how these cases have implications for
all patent dispute settlement agreements. 14
A. Conflict Between Legal Regimes
Waters dividing legal regimes are not always calm. The Patent Act
embodies a careful balance between encouraging new/useful discover-
ies and allowing inventors to reap the benefits of their labor through
an exclusive right to use the invention for a limited time. 15 Con-
versely, the Sherman Act seeks to thwart "unreasonable" restraints of
trade (i.e., monopolies), both criminally and civilly. 16 Thus, some au-
thorities maintain that the Patent Act carves out an exception from
the Sherman Act, with patent law giving the patent holder "a permis-
sible monopoly over the patented work."'1 7 Yet, a quick glance at the
diminutive Sherman Act reveals no such exception, and neither Act
12. See infra notes 15-31 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 45-209 and accompanying text.
15. See Natasha N. Aijalian, The Role of Patent Scope in Biopharmaceutical Patents, 11 B.U. J.
Sci. & TECH. L. 1, 1 (2005) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 150-51 (1989)). The "Patent Act" is 35 U.S.C. §1, et seq. (2000).
16. See generally The Sherman Act 15 U.S.C. §1, et seq. (2004). See also Michael A. Carrier,
Resolving the Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite Innovation, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1104
(2003) ("Section 1 of the Sherman Act targets agreements among competitors and prohibits
'unreasonable' restraints of trade"); David A. Balto & Andrew M. Wolman, Intellectual Property
and Antitrust: General Principles, 43 IDEA 395, 398 (2003) ("Antitrust laws are intended to
ensure that markets remain competitive."). This Comment applies and refers only to Section 1
of the Sherman Act since most of the recent controversy involving patent settlement agreements
involves agreements between competitors (i.e., horizontal restraints), which fall under Section
l's purview.
17. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1067 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted). See also Valley Drug v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1307 (11th Cir.
2003) ("The right of exclusion conferred by a patent has been characterized as a defense to an
antitrust claim... or as a limited exception to the general rule that markets should be free from
barriers to competition." (citations omitted)); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
395 U.S. 100, 136 (1969) ("The heart of [the patent holder's] legal monopoly is the right to
invoke the State's power to prevent others from utilizing his discovery without his consent."
(emphasis added)).
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provides guidance on how these two seemingly opposite legal regimes
should properly co-exist when implicated in a single legal matter. 18
Some commentators applaud the patent and antitrust regimes as
complimentary. 9 Both find their origins in the "fundamental notion
of progress" in our free-market economy that promotes and rewards
innovation, disclosure, and competition.20 Others see the two regimes
as seeking "the same object: the welfare of the public," insofar as the
"[alntitrust law forbids certain agreements tending to restrict output
and elevate prices. . ." and the patent law protects "invention against
prompt imitation in order to encourage more innovation than would
otherwise occur."'2'
Other authorities note an inherent conflict.22 Generally speaking,
"[a]lthough the patent and antitrust systems both attempt to increase
total societal welfare, they pursue this goal through divergent
paths. '23 As the Eleventh Circuit recently noted, "[b]y their nature,
patents create an environment of exclusion, and consequently, cripple
competition. '24 However, "[tihe very exclusion that forms the foun-
dation of the patent system nevertheless may be punished under the
antitrust laws."'25 Patent licenses restrict competition by imposing
quantity restrictions, royalty payments, territorial restrictions, and the
like.26 Antitrust law, in contrast, favors agreements that result in
lower prices, higher output, and increased innovation, and is thus dis-
dainful of any agreements impeding such ideals.27 Since, as discussed
below, patent settlements may contain provisions considered anticom-
petitive because they fix prices or restrict output, such settlements nat-
18. The Patent Act does mention antitrust law in 35 U.S.C. § 211, stating "[niothing in this
chapter shall be deemed to convey to any person immunity from civil or criminal liability, or to
create any defenses to actions, under any antitrust law." 35 U.S.C. § 211(2004).
19. See Balto & Wolman, supra note 16, at 398.
20. Melissa R. Leuenberger-Fisher, In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation: An
Argument for the Rule of Reason, 24 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 417, 417 (2005).
21. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1307-08 (quoting Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, I 1780a (1999)).
22. See Mosier & Ritcheson, supra note 3, at 510 ("It has been said that the patent and anti-
trust regimes are in place to support competition and the consumer while fostering innovation,
but they do so in ways that sometimes meet up like tectonic plates colliding."). See also In re
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting "the tension
between restraints on anti-competitive behavior imposed by the Sherman Act and grants of pat-
ent monopolies under the patent laws .... (emphasis added)). See also James C. Burling, Hatch-
Waxman Patent Settlements: The Battle for a Benchmark, 20-SPG ANTITRUST 41, 42-43 (2006).
23. Carrier, supra note 16, at 1049.
24. Schering, 402 F.3d at 1065-66. But see Hovenkamp, et al., supra note 2, at 1761 (."a
patent is not a right to exclude but rather a right to try to exclude." (emphasis added)).
25. Carrier, supra note 16, at 1050.
26. Id. at 1051.
27. See id. at 1050-51.
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urally trigger antitrust concerns.28  Yet, as one commentator
maintains, "IP law requires that we tolerate departures from a com-
petitive marketplace, but only where legitimate IP rights in fact exist
and are infringed. '29
So, despite arguments that the two regimes are complimentary at a
very abstract level of analysis (i.e., they both protect the public), an
inherent conflict between antitrust and patent law nevertheless re-
mains. Even to the casual eye, this incongruence should be apparent
- one regime prevents monopolies and the other grants them.30
Therefore, as "the exclusion that is the foundation of the patent sys-
tem . . . appears suspicious when viewed through monopolization-
tinted glasses" (i.e., viewing a patent settlement from the Sherman
Act's perspective), it is not surprising that current authorities vary in
their antitrust approaches to patent settlement agreements. 3' How-
ever, before one can properly discuss these inconsistent analytical ap-
proaches, it is essential to understand the typical analytical framework
that courts employ when reviewing potentially anticompetitive
activity.
B. Typical Antitrust Analytical Framework For
Reviewing Agreements
Courts have recognized that merely settling a patent dispute, by it-
self, does not violate antitrust laws. 32 Yet, patent dispute settlement
agreements, like all other potentially anticompetitive business ar-
rangements, are not immune from antitrust review under the Sherman
Act.33 As such, courts dealing with alleged Sherman Act violations
28. See infra notes 33, 42-44 and accompanying text.
29. Hovenkamp, et al., supra note 2, at 1747.
30. See Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 20, at 417. ("These areas of law [may be viewed as] at
direct odds with one another in that antitrust law is aimed at preventing monopolies and al-
lowing free competition wherever and whenever possible, whereas patent law provides monopo-
lies of limited duration, in the form of patent protection in exchange for public disclosure.").
31. Carrier, supra note 16, at 1100.
32. See The Procter & Gamble Co. v. Paragon Trade Brands, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 102, 107 (D.
Del. 1996) (citing Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215, 1220 (4th Cir. 1976)).
33. See Proctor & Gamble, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 107 (holding "... any agreement between com-
petitors may be illegal if part of a larger plan to control interstate markets"). See also Depart-
ment of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property 1995, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.pdf
(last visited Nov. 1, 2005) ("As with other forms of private property, certain types of conduct
with respect to intellectual property may have anticompetitive effects against which the antitrust
laws can and do protect."); see also Mosier & Ritcheson, supra note 3, at 510 ("As a result of a
patent grant, a patentee is entitled to engage in actions that, notwithstanding the patent grant,
would be considered illegal under antitrust law. However, a patent does not absolve the owner
2007]
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generally have two analytical paths to follow - a balancing test (the
"rule of reason" test) or a strict liability test (the "per se" test).34
Unless a challenged activity is among a few categories of restraints
deemed "per se" illegal, the courts usually employ the default test
known as the "rule of reason" when examining allegedly anticompeti-
tive agreements. 35 This test requires courts to "weigh the anticompe-
titive consequences of a practice against its procompetitive
benefits."' 36 One common formulation of this rule requires considera-
tion of: (1) whether the challenged action has an actual adverse effect
on competition; (2) whether the defendant established any pro-com-
petitive redeeming virtues; and (3) whether the plaintiff can show the
pro-competitive effects can be achieved through less-restrictive alter-
nate means. 37 Additionally, "[tihis analysis involves a number of fac-
tors, including specific information about the relevant business, its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the re-
straint's history, nature, and effect." '38
of potential liability under the antitrust laws, and it is when the patentee 'overachieves' in a
settlement that the legal analysis is most complicated.")
34. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust Rules For Pharmaceutical Competition, 39
U.S.F. L. REV. 11, 21 (2004) ("It is commonly said that antitrust analysis proceeds under two
different rules."). There is also a third analytical approach, commonly known as the "quick
look" rule, which "falls somewhere between the per se rule and the rule of reason..." and is used
in ". . .intermediate cases where the anticompetitive impact of a restraint is clear from a quick
look, as in a per se case, but procompetitive justifications for it also exist." Leuenberger-Fisher,
supra note 20, at 424 (citation omitted); accord In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.,
352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2005). However, the cases discussed in the Comment are
generally torn between the two extremes of the per se rule or the rule of reason.
35. See Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 265 (7th Cir. 1981). See also Schering-
Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1064 n.ll (11th Cir. 2005) (holding "[t]he majority of anti-
trust claims are analyzed under the rule of reason" and citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3,
20 (1997)).
36. Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-11 n.6..
37. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 520 (E.D.N.Y
2005). See also In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 202 n. 13 (2d Cir.
2006) ("The rule-of-reason analysis has been divided into three steps. First, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the challenged action has had an actual adverse effect on competition as a
whole in the relevant market. If the plaintiff succeeds in doing so, the burden shifts to the defen-
dant to establish the pro-competitive redeeming virtues of the action. If the defendant succeeds
in meeting its burden, the plaintiff then has the burden of show[ing] that the same pro-competi-
tive effect could be achieved through an alternative means that is less restrictive of competition."
(citations, emphasis, and internal quotations omitted)).
38. Balto & Wolman, supra note 16, at 400 (citation and internal quotations omitted). See
also Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 202 n. 13 ("In most cases ... conduct will be evaluated under a 'rule
of reason' analysis, 'according to which the finder of fact must decide whether the questioned
practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of fac-
tors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed, and the restraint's history, nature, and effect."' (citation omitted)).
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Conversely, under the "per se rule," a court may declare a particular
practice illegal without detailed inquiry into the merits of the case.39
A court will likely use this approach when "it has sufficient experience
to conclude that a certain class of practices is so likely to be anti-com-
petitive without offsetting social benefits" that the more-involved rule
of reason analysis is unnecessary.40 Thus, the only issue that requires
resolution is whether the defendant actually committed the alleged
conduct. 41 For example, most authorities agree that "[h]orizontal
agreements among competing sellers to fix prices or restrict output
are, absent more, per se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. '42
So, if General Electric agrees with Westinghouse (both competitors)
that the latter will manufacture GE light bulbs, but stipulates the price
at which Westinghouse can sell them, such an agreement will likely be
considered a per se unlawful "price fixing" agreement.43 Therefore,
patent settlement agreements "among competitors that set prices,
limit output, or divide markets" also merit antitrust scrutiny.44
C. The General Environment: General Case and Regulatory
Framework Overview
There is no case directly on point that discusses what level of analyt-
ical treatment is appropriate for all patent settlement agreements.
This should not be surprising given the almost infinite combination of
patentable products and questionable settlement provisions. How-
ever, various courts and numerous commentators have recently dedi-
cated much energy to the antitrust implications of pharmaceutical
patent settlements, which is instructive for the purposes of this Com-
ment and applicable to patent settlement agreements generally.45
39. See Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-11 n.7.
40. Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, IP &
ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW §7, 7-11 (2007 Supplement). See also Valley Drug v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294,
1303 (11th Cir. 2003) ("Some types of agreements are so obviously anticompetitive ... that such
agreements can be deemed to violate the Sherman Act without much more than an examination
of the agreement itself and the relationships of the parties to the agreement.").
41. See Balto & Wolman, supra note 16, at 399 (noting that "the defendant may not present
evidence to show that, in fact, the conduct at issue had no anticompetitive effects or indeed had
procompetitive benefits.").
42. Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 225 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla, 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984)). See also Balto &
Wolman, supra note 16, at 399 ("Examples of conduct that is per se illegal under the antitrust
laws are price fixing, bid rigging, and horizontal market allocations.").
43. See Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-12.
44. See Hovenkamp, et al., supra note 2, at 1746.
45. See Daniel A. Crane, Ease Over Accuracy in Assessing Patent Settlements, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 698, 698 (2004) ("Settlement payments from patentee-plaintiffs to allegedly infringing de-
20071
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One commentator has aptly and succinctly described the environ-
ment in which these cases operate:
While the facts of these cases differ considerably, many of them
share a common kernel that exhibits the following pattern. The pio-
neer patentee of a drug files a patent infringement suit against a
rival firm who has or is about to make a generic version of the drug.
The rival may or may not have obtained requisite approval from the
[Food and Drug Administration to market the generic]. The two
parties then settle their patent dispute. Under the settlement the
generic firm who is the infringement defendant agrees not to enter
the market for the drug in question, or else agrees to exit from the
market if it has already begun entry, and agrees not to challenge the
pioneer's patent. In exchange, the patentee/infringement plaintiff
agrees to pay a significant sum of money to the infringement defen-
dant. The result is that for a certain period of years this particular
generic producer is disabled by the settlement agreement from en-
tering the market. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, which gives first
comers to the generic market a temporary exclusive right, the effect
of the agreement may also be to keep other generics from entering
as well.
4 6
Thus, the primary concern in these cases involves so-called "reverse
payment settlements" (sometimes called "exit payments") where the
patent holder "explicitly pays an alleged infringer to stay out of [i.e.,
exit] the market. ' '47 Generally, "[w]hat makes these settlements unu-
sual is that the settlement payment goes from plaintiff to defendant
rather than, as one would assume is more common, from defendant to
plaintiff. '48 Moreover, when the parties settle, they essentially "be-
fendants in exchange for discontinuance of the allegedly infringing use have drawn much atten-
tion recently in government and private antitrust litigation, legal and economic scholarship, and
Congress."). See also Kristopher L. Reed, A Return to Reason: Antitrust Treatment of Pharma-
ceutical Settlements Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 40 GONZ. L. REV. 457,458 (2005) ("The most
recent conflict in IP-antitrust jurisprudence concerns settlements between brand name and ge-
neric drug companies."). As discussed later in this Comment, the Eleventh Circuit uses the
context of a "reverse payment" pharmaceutical case to proclaim the proper antitrust analysis of
patent dispute settlements generally. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
46. Hovenkamp, supra note 34, at 22-23.
47. Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. I11. 2003)
(Posner, C.J., sitting by designation). See also Hovenkamp, supra note 34, at 24 (2004) ("Exit or
non-entry payment cases are a novelty in antitrust.").
48. Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the "Presumptive Illegality" Approach to Settlements of Patent
Disputes Involving Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis and Lemley, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1797 (2003). The Second Circuit also has provided an excellent example of
how the typical infringement case works as opposed to the Hatch-Waxman context, which war-
rants repeating here. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 206-07 (2d
Cir. 2006) ("In the typical patent infringement case, the alleged infringer enters the market with
its drug after the investment of substantial sums of money for manufacturing, marketing, legal
fees, and the like. The patent holder then brings suit against the alleged infringer seeking dam-
ages for, inter alia, its lost profits. If the patent holder wins, it receives protection for the patent
and money damages for the infringement. And in that event, the infringer loses not only the
[Vol. 5:265
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come collaborators rather than rivals in vindicating their patent
rights," which naturally looks suspicious to third parties and antitrust
watchdogs. 49 Accordingly, these agreements have been "criticized
and sometimes invalidated on the theory that they prevent competi-
tion" 50 because the reverse payment "is in effect a payment by the
patent holder to the generic for a period of continued monopoly-like
access to the market."
5 1
Additionally, as noted above, these "reverse payment" cases occur
within the Hatch-Waxman Act as well as the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration ("FDA") drug approval guidelines, both of which serve to
heighten antitrust concerns. The Hatch-Waxman Act supplemented
previous FDA guidelines, resulting in an abbreviated process through
which potential generic drug manufacturers could bring their products
to market.52 These generic drugs are usually not exact duplicates; in-
stead, the generic maker must certify that the drug is a "bioe-
quivalent" of an already-approved name-brand drug, meaning the
generic "contains the same active ingredients, but not necessarily the
same inactive ingredients, as the pioneer drug."'53 Thus, the approval
process is quicker for a generic drug than for a name-brand drug be-
cause Hatch-Waxman allows the generic "to piggyback on the safety
and efficacy studies" that the name-brand maker had already con-
ducted and got approved.54 Yet, to get final FDA approval for a ge-
opportunity to continue in the business of making and selling the infringing product, but also the
investment it made to enter the market for that product in the first place. And it must pay
damages to boot. It makes sense in such a circumstance for the alleged infringer to enter into a
settlement in which it pays a significant amount to the patent holder to rid itself of the risk of
losing the litigation. By contrast, under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the patent holder ordinarily
brings suit shortly after the [infringer's FDA filing] -before the filer has spent substantial sums
on the manufacturing, marketing, or distribution of the potentially infringing generic drug. The
prospective generic manufacturer therefore has relatively little to lose in litigation precipitated
by [its filing] beyond litigation costs and the opportunity for future profits from selling the ge-
neric drug. Conversely, there are no infringement damages for the patent holder to recover, and
there is therefore little reason for it to pursue the litigation beyond the point at which it can
assure itself that no infringement will occur in the first place.").
49. Maureen A. O'Rourke & Joseph F. Brodley, An Incentives Approach to Patent Settle-
ments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis, & Lemley, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1767, 1786 (2003).
50. Asahi, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 994.
51. David Balto, Bringing Clarity to the Patent Settlement Debate: Judge Posner's Asahi Deci-
sion, 23 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 168, 170 (Apr. 2004).
52. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1059 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005). The Act itself
is otherwise known as the "Drug Price Competition and Patent Terms Restoration Act," Pub.L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984), and is "codified at scattered sections of titles 21 and 35 of the
United States Code." Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 191. For a more in-depth analysis of the statutory
scheme, see Steven J. Lee, Recent Trends in Litigation under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 878 PLI/
PAT, 991, 1043-48 (2006).
53. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 191 n.2 (citation omitted).
54. See Valley Drug v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003).
2007]
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neric drug, the filer must also certify either: (a) the name-brand maker
never filed a patent for its drug; (b) that the patent expired; (c) that
the patent will expire on a certain date and that the generic maker will
not market until that time; or (d) that the patent is invalid or the ge-
neric drug would not otherwise infringe on the name-brand.5 5 If the
filer chooses the last option, the applicant must notify the patent
holder, at which time the patent holder must file suit for infringement
within a set period.56 However, if (1) another generic maker also tries
to certify using this option, and (2) the first generic maker successfully
challenges the patent scope or validity, the first generic maker gets a
180-day period where it is the only competitor to the name brand.57
As the Eleventh Circuit fittingly noted, "[t]his exclusivity period is a
significant incentive for generic manufacturers to challenge weak or
narrow drug patents." 58 However, this regulatory scheme has also
been criticized as being "vulnerable to abuse" 59 because the "exclusiv-
ity period offers the potential for collusive settlement arrangements
between pioneers and generics. '60 Once an infringement action is
filed, an automatic thirty-month stay begins where "the FDA cannot
approve any generic drugs related to the pioneer patent, regardless of
the merits of the infringement claim."161 The court can extend this stay
by granting the patent holder a preliminary injunction prior to the
patent's expiration, which extends the FDA approval process pretty
much indefinitely until the court rules that the patent is either invalid
or not infringed.62 However, rather than litigating the merits of the
patent, the patentee can (and often will) settle with the alleged in-
fringer and avoid costly litigation.63 The patent holder might, for ex-
ample, convince the generic maker to forego litigating patent validity
and chose the third FDA certification option - staying out of the
55. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 191. The last option - that the patent is invalid or that the generic
does not infringe- is a known as a "paragraph IV" certification. Id. This certification is preva-
lent throughout the cases analyzed in this Comment.
56. See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1297. See also Larissa Burford, In re Cardizem and Valley
Drug Co.: The Hatch-Waxman Act, Anticompetitive Actions, and Regulatory Reform, 19 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 365, 368 (2004) (noting the patent holder has 45 days in which to file suit); accord
Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Are Settlements of Patent Disputes Illegal Per Se?, 47 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 491 (2002).
57. See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1297-98.
58. Id. at 1298.
59. Burford, supra note 56, at 365.
60. Reed, supra note 45, at 459 (citing Hovenkamp, et al., supra note 2, at 1755).
61. Burford, supra note 56, at 368.
62. Id. at 368-69.
63. See Stephen Roy Jenkins, Valley Drug v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Enlarging the Pat-
ent Exclusionary Right Through Hatch-Waxman Settlement Agreements is Not Per Se Anticompe-
titive?, 6 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 295, 299 (2004).
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market until the patent expires. 64 The patent holder might also settle
with the alleged infringer but require that it not relinquish its exclusiv-
ity period, thus keeping other potential competitors out of the mar-
ket.65 Consequently, "unless and until the first ... applicant actually
enters the market, or the pioneer patent is judicially determined to be
invalid or not infringed, other generic manufacturers will be precluded
from entering and competing against the pioneer and the first generic
entrant. '66 So, in all, a pioneer drug maker can exclude would-be
competitors for considerably extended periods under this regulatory
scheme, and it is easy to see why these cases might raise antitrust red
flags.
Yet, even though antitrust concerns in this environment are justifia-
bly implicated, recent court decisions applying antitrust review princi-
ples when evaluating these settlements "have led to widely different
outcomes .... ",67 Generally, the courts disagree on whether the possi-
bly offensive terms in these cases should be considered per se illegal or
analyzed under the rule of reason.68 Moreover, at least two recent
opinions from the Eleventh Circuit have questioned whether either of
the two traditional analytical approaches are appropriate in the patent
settlement context at all, and have crafted new review tests as such.69
Therefore, as the courts have grappled with this issue in the pharma-
ceutical context, they have unwittingly brought into question all forms
of patent dispute settlements, not just those in the pharmaceutical
world.70 The following section will analyze these cases in greater
detail.
D. Current Authority Varies Its Antitrust Analytical Treatment of
"Reverse Payment" Settlement Agreements
1. "Per Se" Illegality in the Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit's Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation decision was
the first among the contemporary wave of cases dealing with the "re-
64. See, e.g., Valley Drug v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2003); Cipro,
363 F. Supp. 2d at 518-19.
65. See, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 902 (6th Cir. 2003).
66. Cotter, supra note 48, at 1801.
67. Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-41. Accord Carrier, supra note 16, at 1052
("Courts have offered an array of [antitrust] analyses when confronted with patent-based
activity.").
68. David A. Balto & Andrew M. Wolman, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: General Princi-
ples, in 2005 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 7, 81 (Practicing Law Institute, 2005).
69. See supra notes 99-103, 142-143 and accompanying text.
70. See O'Rourke & Brodley, supra note 49, at 1773 (asserting the question of which analyti-
cal framework courts should employ when reviewing patent settlements is "one of the most
vexing issues facing antitrust and intellectual property law today").
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verse payment" problem, and it took the hard-line "per se" ap-
proach. 71 In that case, the defendants were originally on opposite
sides of a patent infringement case.72 In 1995, defendant Andrx
sought FDA approval to sell a generic form of a name-brand drug,
which defendant HMR manufactured. 73 HMR held the patent for the
active ingredient of the drug, but the patent expired in 1992. 74 Under
FDA guidelines, Andrx's filing certified the generic drug did not in-
fringe on any HMR patents.75 However, two months after the filing, a
company called "Carderm Capital" received a patent for the "dissolu-
tion profile" of the drug, which it promptly licensed to HMR.76 In
January 1996, HMR and Carderm filed an infringement suit alleging
Andrx's proposed generic drug would infringe on the new patent.77
While this suit was pending, the FDA gave tentative approval to
Andrx to market the generic drug.78 Shortly thereafter, HMR and
Andrx signed an agreement where Andrx would not market its ge-
neric until either: (a) there was a final, unappealable resolution to the
infringement case, or (b) the parties entered into a license agree-
ment.79 In exchange, Andrx dismissed its counterclaims and was to
receive $40 million per year for a period after final FDA approval. 80
Andrx also agreed to diligently seek FDA approval and not to relin-
quish its 180-day exclusivity once it received it.81 The FDA gave final
approval in June 1998, and the first outside challenger filed suit in
August 1998 alleging the illegality of the settlement agreement under
the Sherman Act.82 All the challenging suits were then consolidated
in the Eastern District of Michigan, where the district court granted
plaintiffs summary judgment and held the agreement was a per se ille-
gal horizontal restraint of trade. 83
On appeal the Sixth Circuit initially acknowledged that the applica-
tion of the per se rule might lead to the condemnation of agreements
that the rule of reason might otherwise allow.84 However, the Court
71. See generally In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
72. See id. at 902.
73. Id. at 901-02.
74. Id. at 901.
75. Id. at 902.
76. Cardizem, 332 F.3d 896 at 902.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 902.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 903.
83. Id. at 903, 905.
84. Id. at 907 n.11.
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found that, "[f]or the sake of business certainty and litigation effi-
ciency, [the Supreme Court has] tolerated the invalidation of some
agreements that a full blown inquiry might have proved to be reasona-
ble."'85 The Court also found the agreement at issue had the effect of
delaying other competitors into the market because Andrx had re-
fused to relinquish its exclusivity. 86
Consequently, the Court could not escape the conclusion that the
settlement agreement "was, at its core, a horizontal agreement to
eliminate competition in the market... throughout the entire United
States, a classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade. ' 87 As
such, the Court held that the agreement deserved per se illegality be-
cause the agreement was "presumed to have the effect of reducing
competition for Cardizem CD and its generic equivalents to the detri-
ment of consumers. '88 Moreover, the Court believed the agreement
could not "be fairly characterized as merely an attempt to enforce pat-
ent rights or an interim settlement of the patent litigation. ' 89 Rather,
the Court said "it is one thing to take advantage of a monopoly that
naturally arises from a patent, but another thing altogether to bolster
the patent's effectiveness in inhibiting competitors by paying the only
potential competitor $40 million per year to stay out of the market." 90
In short, the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court.
2. The Eleventh Circuit. Not "Per Se"
The Eleventh Circuit took a different approach than the Sixth Cir-
cuit in a case quite similar to Cardizem. The plaintiffs in the Valley
Drug v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals case asserted that two agreements
between the three parties to an earlier infringement case violated the
Sherman Act.91 Abbott made the name-brand drug and sued Geneva
and Zenith for patent infringement when the pair sought FDA ap-
proval to market a generic version.92 Abbott entered into a final set-
tlement with Zenith wherein Zenith was paid not to market the
generic until either: (1) someone else introduced a generic product
first, or (2) until the patent for the name-brand expired.93 Similarly,
85. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (quoted in In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896, 907 n.l (6th Cir. 2003)).
86. 332 F.3d at 907.
87. Id. at 908.
88. Id. at 911.
89. Id. at 908.
90. Id.
91. See Valley Drug v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296, 1311 n.25 (11th Cir. 2003).
92. Id. Both filed "paragraph IV" certifications. See id. at 1298-99.
93. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1300.
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Geneva agreed to the same terms with one additional caveat: Geneva
could sell its generic if it obtained a court judgment that its product
was non-infringing or that Abbott's patent was invalid.94 Subse-
quently, a Florida district court held both agreements were per se
illegal. 95
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit refused to apply the per se label
because the exclusionary effect of the agreements here were "at the
heart of the patent right. ' 96 Instead, the Court focused on the "poten-
tial exclusionary power of the patent," and held that "the exclusion of
infringing competition is the essence of the patent grant. ' 97 Conse-
quently, the Court reversed the district court because that court failed
to consider the patent's exclusionary power before applying per se
scrutiny.98
The Eleventh Circuit also explicitly took issue with the Sixth Cir-
cuit's Cardizem decision as such, holding: "[t]o the extent that the
Sixth Circuit suggests that a settlement of patent litigation was a per se
violation of the antitrust laws merely because it involves a generic's
agreement to delay marketing until resolution of the patent infringe-
ment case in exchange for exit payments, we respectfully disagree." 99
The Eleventh Circuit also noted that the "Sixth Circuit opinion did
not purport to measure the several provisions [of the agreement at
issue] against the exclusionary power of the patent, or differentiate
between provisions that fell within the scope of the patent's protection
and those which did not."'100
Therefore, in contrast with the Sixth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit
held that, unless the exclusionary effects of an agreement exceeded
the exclusionary scope of the patent, the agreements would "not [be]
subject to per se antitrust condemnation. '101 However, the Court also
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1301.
96. Id. at 1306.
97. Id. at 1306, 1311 n.26 (holding "the potential exclusionary power of the patent must first
be considered").
98. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1306.
99. Id. at 1311 n.26.
100. Id.
101. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1311. Here, the Court performs what may be classified as an
"exclusionary potential" analysis: comparing the exclusionary potential of the settlement agree-
ment with the exclusionary potential of the patent claims. For an in-depth discussion of the
"exclusionary potential" analysis, see infra notes 265-355 and accompanying text. As discussed
later in this Comment, other courts have utilized similar approaches to patent settlement agree-
ments, but with varying terminology - not just within different decisions but also even within
single decisions. Some courts prefer the phrase exclusionary "power" like the Eleventh Circuit
did here. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. However, the Eleventh Circuit in Valley
Drug later refers to the exclusionary "effect" of a patent. See infra notes 103-105 and accompa-
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noted "rule of reason analysis [would be] similarly inappropriate, as
the anticompetitive effects of exclusion cannot be seriously de-
bated." 10 2 Instead, "what is required ... is an analysis of the extent to
which antitrust liability might undermine [the patent laws'] encour-
agement of innovation and disclosure, or the extent to which the pat-
ent laws prevent antitrust liability from such exclusionary effects. '' 10 3
Ultimately, the Court held that it could not "conclude that the ex-
clusionary effects of the Agreements not to enter the market were
necessarily greater than the exclusionary effects of the .. .patent
merely because Abbott paid Geneva and Zenith in return for their
respective agreements.' '1 04 However, the Court remanded the case
and held, "[a]ny provisions of the Agreements found to have effects
beyond the exclusionary effects of [the] patent may then be subject to
traditional antitrust analysis to assess their probable anticompetitive
effects . "105
The Court did not say whether the per se rule or "rule of reason"
test would be the appropriate "traditional analysis" to employ on re-
mand. Instead, the Court cautioned that one cannot not easily draw a
categorical line "between restraints that give rise to an intuitively ob-
vious inference of anticompetitive effect and those that call for more
detailed treatment."'01 6 Rather, in making its analysis, any reviewing
court must consider "the circumstances, details, and logic of a
restraint."10 7
3. The Eleventh Circuit on Remand: The Return of "Per Se"
Later, the Geneva agreement received further scrutiny when Valley
Drug was handled on remand in the Terazosin Hydrochloride Anti-
nying text. Other courts refer to the exclusionary "scope" of a patent. See infra notes 114-115,
143, 181, and 203, and accompanying text. One court referred to the exclusionary "value" of a
patent. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. For the sake of eliminating any confusion this
may cause, these courts are looking at the same issue no matter how phrased: whether the ability
of the patent settlement agreement to exclude competitors exceeds the ability of the patent itself
to do the same. The phrase "exclusionary potential" is not unique, and instead comes from a
later Eleventh Circuit opinion clarifying this test. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
This article adopts "exclusionary potential" as the preferred term.
102. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1311 n.27.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1309 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 1312 (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 1313 (quoting California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780-81 (1999)).
107. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1313. Accord Procter & Gamble Co. v. Paragon Trade Brands,
Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 102, 107 (Del. 1996) (citing Duplan Corp. v. Deering Miliken, Inc., 540 F.2d
1215, 1221 (4th Cir. 1976)). ("The Fourth Circuit has explained that in analyzing a settlement
agreement to determine if it violates the antitrust laws, the 'critical factor' is the 'anticompetitive
intent or purpose of the parties'.... (emphasis added)).
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trust Litigation case. 108 Since the Valley Drug decision did not provide
an analytical framework for considering the "exclusionary scope" of
the patent at issue, the Florida district court turned to Professor Her-
bert Hovenkamp, who the Court deemed knowledgeable on "the
complex issues that arise when parties enter into a settlement agree-
ment that would potentially constitute an antitrust violation in the ab-
sence of claimed IP rights."'10 9 Accordingly, the Court adopted the
following Hovenkamp-proffered test: "... once conduct is found that
would likely be an antitrust violation in the absence of a settlement,
some care must be taken to ensure (1) that the parties did have a bona
fide dispute, (2) that the settlement is a reasonable accommodation,
and (3) that the settlement is not more anticompetitive than a likely
outcome of the litigation."110
Along these lines, the Court also held that the "exclusionary value
of [a] patent ... cannot be defined by looking at the patent terms in a
vacuum; instead, when litigation is pending as to the validity of the
patent, the chances that the patent will be held valid must be consid-
ered as part of the analysis.""' Thus, after providing "a limited as-
sessment of the underlying patent infringement case," the Court held
that the likely outcome would be that the patent would have been
declared invalid. 112 As such, the Court deemed the Geneva agree-
ment as being beyond the scope of the patent's protection. 113
After making this determination, the Court next considered the ap-
propriate antitrust analysis to apply: either per se illegality or rule of
reason.114 In other words, following the Valley Drug mandate, the dis-
trict court still conducted a traditional antitrust analysis after it found
the provision at issue "exceed[ed] the exclusionary scope of the pat-
ent." 1' 5  Accordingly, the district court recognized that "horizontal
agreements between competitors are antitrust's most 'suspect' classifi-
cation, which as a group provoke closer scrutiny than any other ar-
rangement.' 1 6 The Court also ruled that "[i]f the Agreement is one
that presents 'a naked restraint of trade with no purpose except sti-
108. See generally In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279
(S.D. Fla. 2005).
109. Id. at 1295. Professor Hovenkamp, at the time of publication, teaches at the University
of Iowa Law School, is an oft-cited authority on the antitrust implications of IP agreements, and
is cited virtually in every case (in some form or another) analyzed in this Comment.
110. Terazosin, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1295. (citing Hovenkamp, et al., supra note 2, at 1727).
111. Id. at 1296-97.
112. See id. at 1299-1307.
113. See id. at 1307-10.
114. See id. at 1310-11.
115. Terazosin, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1310.
116. Id. at 1313.
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fling competition,' it qualifies for per se treatment. '"117 Moreover, "[a]
particular horizontal agreement is defined as a naked restraint 'if it is
formed with the objectively intended purpose or likely effect of in-
creasing price or decreasing market wide output in the short run, mea-
sured by quantity or quality.' "118
Going further, the Court found that the Geneva agreement called
for Geneva to refrain from marketing its generic product "even after
an adverse district court ruling as to the validity of [the] patent." 1 9
However, the Court also noted "Zenith settled this action and is no
longer a party to this multi-district litigation.' 20 Thus, while it is not
clear why from the opinion, the Zenith agreement was not subject to
remand.121 Nevertheless, citing the Cardizem decision, the Terazosin
court ultimately called the Geneva agreement "a 'classic example' of
an output-reducing, naked restraint on trade that qualifie[d] for per se
treatment" and stuck it down.122
4. The Eleventh Circuit Revisited: Not "Per Se" and Not Rule
of Reason
The Eleventh Circuit upheld Valley Drug in the Schering-Plough
Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission case. 23 There, two generic manu-
facturers (Upsher and ESI) sought FDA approval to market a generic
version of Schering's name-brand drug.124 Both certified that neither
infringed on Schering's product. 125 Schering then sued for patent in-
fringement. 126 Schering agreed to drop its patent claims against Up-
sher and paid Upsher approximately $60 million.127 Upsher then
granted Schering the right to market a certain number of Upsher
products (especially a product called "Niacor") in various other
fields.' 28 Upsher also agreed not to enter the market with its generic
version of Schering's product until about five years later but before
117. Id. at 1314.
118. Terazosin, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1314 (citing 11 Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW
1902a (2d ed. 2005) (emphasis added)).
119. Id. at 1314-15.
120. Id. at 1286 n.3.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1315.
123. See generally Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).
124. See id. at 1057-1061.
125. See id. at 1059-60.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1060.
128. Schering, 402 F.3d at 1060.
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the patent expired. 129 Schering and ESI also entered a similar settle-
ment agreement, although the sum paid was about half as much.
130
The FTC filed an administrative complaint against Schering, Up-
sher, and ESI alleging the agreements were illegal restraints of trade
under the Sherman Act.' 3 ' An administrative law judge first tried the
case and held "both agreements were lawful settlements of legitimate
patent lawsuits, and dismissed the complaint."'1 32 The judge further
found that the "presence of payments did not make the settlement
anticompetitive, per se" but instead assessed "the strength of the pat-
ent itself and its exclusionary power."'1 33 Although the judge found no
monopoly, FTC counsel appealed the decision to the full Commis-
sion.' 34 The full Commission reversed but, while refraining from call-
ing the agreements per se illegal, it "concluded that the quid pro quo
for the payment was an agreement to defer the entry dates, and that
such a delay would injure competition and consumers.' 35 Therefore,
FTC issued an order barring the settlements.' 36
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit began by discussing the Valley Drug
case, which it had decided a mere two years earlier. 137 The Court
noted that Valley Drug involved an "interim settlement agreement"
where the Court had "concluded that monetary payments made to an
alleged infringer as part of a patent litigation settlement did not con-
stitute a per se violation of antitrust law.' 38 The Court then stated
that, even though it had called the agreement at issue in Valley Drug
"clearly anticompetitive," it had "nonetheless reversed [in that case]
for a rather simple reason: one of the parties owned a patent."'1 3
9
The Eleventh Circuit also took great care to mention that the Ter-
azosin decision (i.e., when the Geneva agreement was on remand in
Valley Drug) still applied a per se analysis anyway. 140 However, the
129. Id.
130. See id. at 1060-61. Of the payments to ESI, $15 million was attributed to the licensing of
ESI products to Schering, but the remaining $15 million was for legal fees and a contingency
payment for ESI's FDA approval. See id.
131. Schering, 402 F.3d at 1061.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1061-62.
135. Id. at 1062. The FTC's decision in this regard might strike some as particularly odd.
Not only does it ignore the administrative law judge who employed an "exclusionary power"
approach like the Schering court ultimately uses, but it also does not employ traditional antitrust
analysis language yet reaches an ultimate result arguably akin to a per se application.
136. Schering, 402 F.3d at 1062.
137. See id. at 1063.
138. Id. at 1063-64.
139. Id. at 1064.
140. Schering, 402 F.3d at 1066 n.14.
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Schering court noted that its case was "wholly different than Valley
Drug," insofar as Valley Drug partially involved an interim settlement
of patent litigation that did not allow marketing of the product before
patent expiration, whereas the case at bar involved a final settlement
disposing of the case.141
Turning back to its case, the Schering court held "both approaches
[either the "per se rule" or "rule of reason"] are ill-suited for an anti-
trust analysis of patent cases because they seek to determine whether
the challenged conduct had an anticompetitive effect on the market,"
because patents "[b]y their nature... create an environment of exclu-
sion" and thus "[t]he anticompetitive effect is already present."' 142
"Therefore, in line with Valley Drug, [the Court held] the proper anal-
ysis of antitrust liability requires an examination of: (1) the scope of
the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the
agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive
effects.' 43 However, while its focus was on "the extent to which the
exclusionary effects of the agreement fall within the scope of the pat-
ent's protection," the Eleventh Circuit did not discuss what, if any,
antitrust analysis should be employed if the agreement is deemed in
excess of the patent's protection as it had in Valley Drug.144 In the
end, the Court granted the petition for review and set aside the FTC
order.1
45
5. Judge Posner's Favorable Take on Patent Settlements
Even before Schering, Judge Richard Posner weighed in with his
approval of patent litigation settlement agreements in the Asahi Glass
v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals case. 146 There, the plaintiff Asahi claimed
a settlement agreement between defendants Glaxo and Pentech
amounted to a market division in violation of the Sherman Act."47 In
2000, Glaxo sued Pentech, a generic manufacturer of Paxil-brand
medication, for patent infringement. 148 Pentech had begun to manu-
141. Id.
142. Schering, 402 F.3d at 1065-66 (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 1066. See also Andrx Pharm. v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227 1235, (11th Cir. 2005)
(recently upholding this test but not applying it).
144. Schering, 402 F.3d at 1076. See also supra note 105 and accompanying text.
145. Schering, 402 F.3d at 1076.
146. Asahi Glass was decided October 29, 2003, over a year before Schering. See generally
Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. I11. 2003). How-
ever, Valley Drug, the Eleventh Circuit's precursor to Schering, had been decided a mere month
before Asahi on September 15, 2003. See generally Valley Drug v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d
1294, 1296, 1311 n.25 (11th Cir. 2003).
147. Asahi, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 990.
148. Id. at 988.
20071
284 DEPAUL BUSINESS &.COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
facturer, but not sell, a generic version of the drug.1 49 Under the set-
tlement, Glaxo licensed Pentech to immediately sell its drug in Puerto
Rico and throughout the rest of the United States only after another
generic version came on the market. 150 Pentech would also have to
leave the U.S. market if the other generic maker left. 151 While Glaxo
did not charge Pentech for the drug that Pentech relabeled and resold,
Glaxo did receive a "hefty royalty fee" for Pentech's sales. 152 Pentech
could buy from anyone else besides Glaxo including the plaintiffs, but
would still have to pay the royalty. 153
After dismissing the plaintiff's patent invalidity claims for lack of
federal subject matter jurisdiction, Judge Posner, sitting by designa-
tion as a district judge, turned to the antitrust claims.' 54 Since Asahi
was merely a supplier of the active ingredient rather than a drug man-
ufacturer, he quickly disposed of Asahi's antitrust claims due to lack
of standing "to complain about a violation of the antitrust laws at the
customer level."'1 55
Nevertheless, Posner held that, even if the plaintiff had standing,
"its antitrust claim regarding the settlement and license must be dis-
missed."'1 56 First, he noted that "[t]he general policy of the law is to
favor settlement of litigation, and the policy extends to the settlement
of patent infringement suits."' 57 Posner then held that "[o]nly if a pat-
ent settlement is a device for circumventing antitrust law is it vulnera-
ble to an antitrust suit."'1 58 Accordingly, he ruled that if "there is
nothing suspicious about the circumstances of a patent settlement,
then to prevent a cloud from being cast over the settlement process a
third party should not be permitted to haul the parties to the settle-
ment over the hot coals of antitrust litigation."' 59 Since Glaxo and
Pentech were not natural allies and that since he ruled the underlying
patent was valid in another suit anyway, Posner found nothing suspi-
cious or frivolous about the settlement agreement. 160
149. Id. at 988-89. It is not entirely clear from the opinion, but it appears as though Pentech
never began the FDA approval process or made a paragraph IV certification. Id.
150. Asahi, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 989.
151. Id.
152. Asahi, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 989.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 990.
155. Id. at 990-1.
156. Id. at 991.
157. Asahi, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 991.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 991-2.
160. See id. at 993.
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Even though the case ended on technical grounds, Posner did not
stop there. In dicta, he turned to the "reverse payment" settlement
issue, although he noted the issue did not arise between Glaxo and
Pentech. 161 He explicitly questioned authorities asserting that such
payments prevent competition, including Professor Hovenkamp. 162
Instead, Posner noted, "if settlement negotiations fell through and the
patentee went on to win his suit, competition would be prevented to
the same extent. ' 163 He also found "[a] ban on reverse-payment set-
tlements would reduce the incentive to challenge patents by reducing
the challenger's settlement options should he be sued for infringement
... 164 Moreover, Posner opined, "any settlement agreement can be
characterized as involving 'compensation' to the defendant, who
would not settle unless he had something to show for the settle-
ment. ' 165 Thus, he found that "[i]f any settlement agreement is thus
to be classified as involving a forbidden 'reverse payment,' we shall
have no more patent settlements. '166
6. The Eastern District of New York: Rule of Reason
Just a few weeks after Schering, the Eastern District of New York
chimed in to further muddy the "reverse payment" waters in the
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation ("Cipro") case.167
Bayer owned the patent on the active ingredient in a drug. 168 From
1987 until 2004, Bayer was the only producer of the drug in this coun-
try.169 However, in 1991, Barr sought FDA approval to market its
generic version before the patent's expiration. 170 Consequently,
Bayer sued Barr for patent infringement, and the parties entered into
a settlement agreement wherein Bayer paid Barr $49 million in ex-
change for agreeing not market the generic until the patent's expira-
tion.171 The parties also entered into a "consent judgment" which: (a)
161. See id. at 994.
162. Asahi, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 994 (discussing Hovenkamp, et al., supra note 2, at 1749-63 and
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896, 907-08 (6th Cir. 2003)).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. (emphasis in original).
166. Id. See also Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1074-75 (11th Cir. 2005) (cit-
ing Asahi with approval).
167. Schering came down March 8, 2005. See Schering, 402 F.3d 1056. Cipro came down
March 31, 2005. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514
(E.D.N.Y 2005).
168. Cipro, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 518.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 518-19.
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terminated the litigation; (b) admitted patent validity; and (c) admit-
ted Barr's infringement. 172 Then, of course, the agreement was subse-
quently challenged as an antitrust violation.173
In 2003, the Court heard the case for the first time held that, since
the "[t]he policies behind the patent laws and the Sherman Act are to
some extent in conflict," the rule of reason "should be employed" be-
cause of "[t]he flexibility necessary to balance these competing poli-
cies."' 174 The Court also held that, while the law's general policy of
favoring settlement agreements cannot save per se violations of the
Sherman Act, "a rule that too quickly condemns actions as per se ille-
gal ... does competition - and thus, the Sherman Act - a disser-
vice."' 175 As such, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment alleging
the reverse payment scheme met the "anticompetitive conduct" re-
quirement under the rule of reason analysis. 176
Considering the same case in 2005, the Court discussed the Schering
case, which the Eleventh Circuit decided a mere three weeks ear-
lier.177 The Cipro court noted the Eleventh Circuit had questioned
"the appropriateness of the per se versus rule of reason approach for
claims of antitrust violations involving patents.' 78 Yet, the Cipro
court interpreted the Schering decision "as breaking the first step of
[the] rule of reason analysis - assessing the actual adverse effects on
competition - into three steps to determine whether there are any
anti-competitive effects that exceed the scope of the patent."' 79
This distinction notwithstanding, the Cipro court held that,
"[r]egardless of whether the Eleventh Circuit intended to jettison the
rule of reason analysis in the patent context or simply refine the analy-
sis," it was going to use the rule of reason analysis in the 2005 case as
it had dictated in 2003.180 Ultimately, the plaintiffs failed to show the
anticompetitive effect of the agreement since it did not go beyond the
172. Id. at 518-19. The Court also implied that Barr filed a paragraph IV certification even
though "there [was] no dispute that Barr's product would have infringed Bayer's patent." Id. at
518. This certainly looks suspicious.
173. Cipro, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 518-19.
174. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 255 (E.D.N.Y.
2003)
175. ld. at 256.
176. Cipro, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 520.
177. See generally 363 F. Supp. 2d 514.
178. See id. at 520, n.48.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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scope of the patent claims.18t Consequently, the Court did not go fur-
ther into the rule of reason analysis and held for the defendants. 8 2
7. Recent Ruling in the Second Circuit Apparently Follows the
Eleventh Circuit
Most recently, the Second Circuit decided the Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litigation case, in which it arguably followed the Eleventh
Circuit's Schering opinion. 183 Yet, the Tamoxifen case is unique from
the others discussed above because it includes a published dissenting
opinion. 184
The facts of Tamoxifen are similar to the preceding cases, although
they are perhaps more complex. Imperial Chemical Industries
("ICI") held the patent for the drug "tamoxifen" which today is (ac-
cording to the Court) the most prescribed breast cancer treatment
drug in the world. 185 In 1985, a competitor, Barr, sought FDA ap-
proval to market a generic version of the drug four months after ICI
was awarded the patent. 86 Barr filed its FDA form saying it was not
infringing (or alternatively that the patent was invalid) and was then
promptly sued for patent infringement.' 87 In 1992, a New York dis-
trict court judge declared the patent invalid because ICI had withheld
some side effect information from the Patent Office.1 88 ICI quickly
appealed the invalidity decision to the Federal Circuit, but while the
Federal Circuit mulled it over, ICI's successor ("Zeneca") entered
into a settlement agreement with Barr. 189
Under the agreement, Barr agreed not to market its generic drug
until Zeneca's patent expired in exchange for $21 million and a non-
exclusive license to sell Zeneca-made tamoxifen under Barr's brand
name. 90 Zeneca also had to pay Barr's raw materials supplier
Heumann (who Zeneca had also sued for infringement) $9.5 million
up front and $35 million over the next ten years.t 91 The parties fur-
ther agreed that if: (1) another lawsuit was brought; (2) another ge-
neric manufacturer prevailed like Barr had; and (3) said judgment was
181. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 541 (E.D.N.Y
2005).
182. Id.
183. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187 passim (2d Cir. 2006).
184. See id. at 221-233 (Pooler, C.J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 193.
186. Id.
187. Id. Barr began the FDA approval process in 1985, but did not file its form until 1987. Id.
188. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 193.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 193-94.
191. ld. at 194.
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not appealed or affirmed on appeal, Barr would revert to the same
position as if the Federal Circuit had ruled in its favor.192 The parties
subsequently filed a joint motion to dismiss/vacate the district court's
decision holding the patent invalid, which the Federal Circuit later
granted thus restoring the patent. 193 Third party suits challenging the
settlement agreement under antitrust law came next, which were eon-
solidated into a multi-district litigation before the Eastern District of
New York.194
The district court upheld the settlement agreement distinguishing it
from the Geneva agreement in Valley Drug and the agreement in
Cardizem, both of which "did not conclude the underlying litigation
and instead prolonged the period during which other generic manu-
facturers could not enter the market."'1 95 Additionally, although it is
not clear from the Second Circuit's opinion, the district court below
may have used some form of a rule of reason approach, insofar as the
district court "concluded that even if the plaintiffs had stated an anti-
trust violation, they did not suffer antitrust injury . . . ",196 In other
words, the district court looked at what adverse impact the agreement
had on competition, which is the first step in the rule of reason analy-
sis 197 but is not allowed under the per se rule. 198 Consequently, the
district court found that any injury the plaintiffs had suffered was not
an antitrust injury, "but rather the result of the legal monopoly that a
patent holder possesses."'199
On appeal the Second Circuit began its analysis by first noting "the
tension between restraints on anti-competitive behavior imposed by
the Sherman Act and grants of patent monopolies under the patent
192. Id.
193. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 194. The Second Circuit also noted that "[s]uch a vacatur, while
generally considered valid as a matter of appellate procedure by courts at the time of the Settle-
ment Agreement, was shortly thereafter held to be invalid in nearly all circumstances by the
Supreme Court." Id. (citing U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18,
27-29 (1994)). However, fortunately for the parties involved in Tamoxifen, the Supreme
Court's new rule did not apply retroactively. Id. at 194 n.8 (citing U.S. Philips Corp. v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 55 F.3d 592, 598 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1010 (1995)). Therefore,
the tamoxifen patent was suddenly valid once more. Later, when other generic manufacturers
tried to challenge patent validity, said plaintiffs were rebuffed and the patent's validity was up-
held in its own right. See id. at 195 ("In each case, the court rejected the generic manufacturer's
attempt to rely on the vacated Tamoxifen I decision, and-contrary to the Tamoxifen I judg-
ment- upheld the validity of Zeneca's tamoxifen patent.").
194. Id. at 196.
195. Id. at 197.
196. Id. at 198.
197. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
199. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 198 (quoting the district court).
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laws, as complicated by the Hatch-Waxman Act .... "200 The Court
also noted "[riules severely restricting patent settlements might also
be contrary to the goals of the patent laws because the increased num-
ber of continuing lawsuits that would result would heighten the uncer-
tainty surrounding patents and might delay innovation. '20 1
Accordingly, the Court, citing Valley Drug and Asahi with approval
and distinguishing Cardizem, "decline[d] to conclude ... that reverse
payments are per se violations of the Sherman Act such that an allega-
tion of an agreement to make reverse payments suffices to assert an
antitrust violation." 20 2
Instead, the Second Circuit specifically agreed with the Eleventh
Circuit's Schering holding that a patent holder paying a generic com-
petitor money cannot be the only basis of a Sherman Act violation
unless the "exclusionary effects of the agreement exceed the scope of
the patent's protection. ' 20 3 Ultimately, the Court held the settlement
agreement being reviewed did "nothing that would place it beyond
the legitimate exclusionary scope of Zeneca's patent," and therefore
the Court affirmed the district court.204 However, although the
Tamoxifen opinion frequently cited the lower Cipro decisions with
seeming approval,20 5 it did not explicitly adopt the rule of reason as
the appropriate test like the Cipro court, assuming the patent scope
had been exceeded. 2°6
The Tamoxifen dissent would have taken an entirely different ap-
proach. 20 7 The dissent somewhat agreed with the majority, insofar as
200. Id. at 202. For a brief discussion on the interaction and conflict between the two regimes,
see supra notes 15-31 and accompanying text.
201. Id. at 203.
202. Id. at 206. Along these lines and in distinguishing Cardizem, the Court also said: "[wie
do not think that the fact that the patent holder is paying to protect its patent monopoly, without
more, establishes a Sherman Act violation." Id. (emphasis added).
203. Id. at 212 (citing In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514,
528 (E.D.N.Y 2005). and Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotations omitted)). See also id. at 213 n.27 ("The central criterion as to the legality of
a patent settlement agreement is whether it exceeds the scope of the patent's protection." (inter-
nal quotations omitted)).
204. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 215, 221. Moreover, the Court also assessed the potential an-
ticompetitive effects (even though this was probably unnecessary given the settlement did not
exceed the patent scope) and concluded that the agreement "did not entirely foreclose competi-
tion in the market for tamoxifen." Id. at 215.
205. See, e.g., id. at 212-215 (citing both the 2003 and 2005 Cipro cases).
206. See supra notes 177-182 and accompanying text. This is particularly relevant as both
Cipro and Tamoxifen originated from the Eastern District of New York, but Cipro to date has
not been appealed to the Second Circuit. Consequently, whether the Second Circuit will adopt
the rule of reason test to review patent settlement agreements that exceed the exclusionary po-
tential of the patent at issue remains to be seen.
207. See generally Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 221-232. (Pooler, C.J., dissenting).
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"the strength of the patent must be central to any antitrust analysis
involving a patent. ' 208 However, the dissent proposed that a review-
ing court must also look at: "(a) the amount the patent holder paid to
keep the generic manufacturer from marketing its product, (b) the
amount the generic manufacturer stood to earn during its period of
exclusivity, and (c) any ancillary anti-competitive effects of the agree-
ment including the presence or absence of a provision allowing the
parties to manipulate the generic's exclusivity period. '209
III. ANALYSIS
This section will briefly compare the holdings of the reverse pay-
ment cases so that one can fully understand the extent of the varying
opinions between the courts. 210 It continues by offering some practi-
cal tips for drafting/defending patent dispute settlement agreements
based on patterns derived from these cases and various commenta-
tors.211 It concludes by offering a proposed position for the Supreme
Court to adopt - namely, comparing the "exclusionary potential" of
the agreement versus the patent before condemning the agreement as
a Sherman Act violation. 212
A. Tying Everything Together: A Holding Comparison
Before Cipro and Tamoxifen, one could fairly say that the key
points of disagreement between the courts were whether the agree-
ments being reviewed "[were] per se illegal under the antitrust laws,
and how such agreements should be analyzed. ' 213 The courts ap-
peared to be at opposite ends of a spectrum, with "[t]he Sixth Circuit
believ[ing] that such agreements are per se illegal, while the Eleventh
Circuit [maintaining] that the extent of the patent grant must be ana-
lyzed before any decision on the antitrust claim can be made.121 4
However, this oversimplifies the disagreement between the courts as
it stands today.
At a rudimentary level, it looks like the Sixth and Eleventh Circuit
decisions are at odds, but upon deeper reflection the positions might
208. Id. at 228.
209. Id. Accord Hovenkamp, et al., supra note 2, at 1759 (proposing that reverse payments be
"presumptively unlawful" (i.e., per se unlawful), to only be rebutted by the "infringement plain-
tiff" showing, inter alia, "the size of the payment is no more than the expected value of
litigation").
210. See infra notes 213-238 and accompanying text.
211. See infra notes 240-356 and accompanying text.
212. See infra notes 357-383 and accompanying text.
213. Mosier & Ritcheson, supra note 3, at 510.
214. Id.
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not be that far apart. The Sixth Circuit in Cardizem was quick to ap-
ply the per se rule when it determined the settlement agreement
would have reduced the market for the name-brand drug and generic
equivalents. 215 In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit in Valley Drug took
issue with the Sixth Circuit because the Sixth Circuit failed to compare
the settlement agreement with the "exclusionary power" of the patent
or differentiate between agreement provisions that had exceeded the
patent scope. 216
Are the two holdings in Cardizem and Valley Drug really as incon-
gruent as they may seem on the surface? As discussed, the Sixth Cir-
cuit also explicitly condemned the settlement agreement being
reviewed because it had gone beyond "merely an attempt to enforce
patent rights ... 217 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit referenced the court
below, which had determined that the "agreement's restrictions ex-
tended to noninfringing and/or potentially noninfringing versions" of
the generic drug at issue. 218 A fair reading of this language suggests
the Sixth Circuit might be inclined to accept a settlement agreement
so long as it did not go beyond an attempt to enforce patent rights or
cover noninfringing products. In other words, perhaps the Sixth Cir-
cuit gave at least some credence to whether the agreement exceeded
the patent's "scope" and, finding that it had indeed exceeded the pat-
ent's protections, the Court applied the per se rule. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit in Valley Drug is then arguably analogous to Cardizem, insofar as
the Eleventh Circuit held that, once an agreement has exceeded the
patent scope, a court could then apply "traditional" antitrust analysis
(i.e., either per se or rule of reason). 219
Any similarity notwithstanding, one cannot be sure if the Sixth Cir-
cuit would adopt the Eleventh Circuit's position, especially since
Cardizem is the only Sixth Circuit opinion available discussing this is-
sue. Moreover, the Valley Drug opinion operates under the assump-
tion that the two courts are indeed at odds, apparently believing that
the Sixth Circuit applied per se scrutiny "merely" because the parties
had delayed the generic's entry with the reverse payment.220 Never-
215. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896, 911 (6th Cir. 2003).
216. Valley Drug v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1311 n.26 (11th Cir. 2003).
217. Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 908.
218. Id. at 908 n.13. See also M. Elaine Johnston & Matthew Galvin, Antitrust Aspects of
Settling Intellectual Property Litigation, 867 PLI/PAT 159, 182 (2006).
219. See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1312.
220. See id. at 1312 n.26 (holding that "[t]o the extent that the Sixth Circuit suggests that a
settlement of patent litigation was a per se violation ... merely because it involves a generic's
agreement to delay marketing until resolution of the patent infringement case in exchange for
[reverse] payments, we respectfully disagree.").
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theless, there is no need to reconcile the holdings here. The Eleventh
Circuit in Valley Drug is correct - the Sixth Circuit did not compare
the settlement with the "exclusionary power" of the patent or deter-
mine if any provisions did not exceed this power. Also, most com-
mentators analyzing the reverse payment problem seem to believe
these two opinions are fundamentally incongruous. 221 Thus, unless
the Sixth Circuit decides to clarify, one can safely operate under the
same assumption of incongruity.
Comparing the remaining cases, the divergence does not necessarily
get any easier to swallow. On remand from Valley Drug, the Ter-
azosin court applied the per se rule to the agreement at issue (like the
Sixth Circuit), 222 but only after it considered the "exclusionary scope"
of the patent (unlike the Sixth Circuit). 223 However, the Schering
court later declared that both of the traditional analytical approaches
are "ill suited for an antitrust analysis of patent cases", and crafted its
own test. 224 Moreover, although the Eleventh Circuit did so in Valley
Drug,225 the same court in Schering did not say whether traditional
antitrust analysis could then be applied if the agreement exceeded the
patent's exclusionary scope.226 This distinction could be extremely
221. See, e.g., Burford, supra note 56, at 371 (comparing Valley Drug to Cardizem and assert-
ing "[i]n cases with similar facts, the Sixth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit have ruled differently on
issues of alleged pharmaceutical antitrust violations."); Deborah A. Coleman, Antitrust Issues in
the Litigation and Settlement of Infringement Claims, 37 AKRON L. REV. 263, 276-77 (2004)
(noting that the Sixth Circuit applied the per se standard in Cardizem, whereas "most tribunals
have considered the purpose and actual effect of an infringement settlement agreement...");
Mosier & Ritcheson, supra note 3, at 497 (referring to Cardizem and Valley Drug as "seemingly
contradictory"); Hovenkamp, supra note 34, at 26 (asserting that Valley Drug "required a full
rule of reason analysis," which was "in contrast" to the Sixth Circuit's per se approach in
Cardizem); Reed, supra note 45, at 468 (asserting that "[a] mere three months after the Sixth
Circuit decided In re Cardizem, the Eleventh Circuit reintroduced ambiguity at the circuit level
with its decision in Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.")
222. See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1314-15
(S.D. Fla. 2005).
223. See id. at 1310-11.
224. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065-66 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding "the
proper analysis of antitrust liability [of a patent settlement] requires an examination of: (1) the
scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed
that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects"). Yet, recall that Schering did not over-
rule Terazosin because the district court was considering an interim settlement as opposed to a
final settlement. Id. at 1066 n.14. Consequently, the Schering court held that "[g]iven these
material distinctions, the same analysis cannot apply." Id.
225. See Valley Drug v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003).
226. See Schering, 402 F.3d at 1076. To be fair, the Schering court never got a chance because
it apparently found that the settlement agreement did not exceeded the patent. See infra notes
293-299 and accompanying text. Yet, while the Eleventh Circuit recently upheld the Schering
analytical approach in Andrx Pharmaceuticals v. Elan Corp., the Court never made an antitrust
analysis, as the Andrx decision is a pleading sufficiency matter under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 12(c). See Andrx Pharm. v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2005).
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important for settling parties because Valley Drug leaves the door
open for both traditional antitrust approaches even after an exclusion-
ary scope analysis. 227 In other words, broadly read, an agreement
under Valley Drug could fail an exclusionary analysis and might still
garner either the more flexible rule of reason analysis or the ominous
"per se" rule, and this approach would effectively give settling parties
a second chance at salvation. Conversely, Schering can be read as a
mandate to stop any antitrust consideration of a patent settlement at
the exclusionary scope doorstep, as the Court said "both approaches"
are inappropriate for patent cases.228 This would be a one-shot deal.
In short, even within the Eleventh Circuit alone, there is some per-
plexing ambiguity that warrants clarification.
To make matters worse, remember the Terazosin court, following
Valley Drug but before Schering, considered exclusionary scope but
then went into a traditional antitrust analysis and chose per se illegal-
ity.229 However, recall that Schering differentiated itself from Ter-
azosin because the agreement the lower court reviewed was not
"final. '2 30 One could fairly interpret this as the Eleventh Circuit be-
lieving that further "traditional" antitrust analysis (per se analysis at
that) is appropriate in the "interim" agreement context, but otherwise
a reviewer should only make an "exclusionary potential" analysis and
stop there. One cannot be sure, but again this distinction could be
important to settling parties facing later antitrust challenges.
Furthermore, shortly after Schering, the Eastern District of New
York, in Cipro, held that it was unable to determine "whether the
Eleventh Circuit intended to jettison the rule of reason analysis in the
patent context or simply refine the analysis .... ",231 Certainly, Scher-
ing does not make this clear. Yet, the Cipro court ultimately held it
was going to use the rule of reason anyway in order to properly bal-
ance the "competing policies" between patent and antitrust law.2 32 In
other words, like Terazosin, the Cipro court did not merely stop at the
"exclusionary scope" analysis. Finally, while the Second Circuit in
Tamoxifen frequently cited the lower Cipro decision with approval, 233
227. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
228. See Schering, 402 F.3d at 1065-66.
229. See supra notes 222-223 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
231. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 520 n.8 (E.D.N.Y
2005).
232. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 520 n.48
(E.D.N.Y 2005); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 255-57
(E.D.N.Y. 2003).
233. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 212-15 (2d Cir. 2006)
(citing both the 2003 and 2005 Cipro cases).
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it did not purport to adopt the rule of reason as the appropriate ana-
lytical test - even though the Tamoxifen opinion formally disap-
proves of the per se approach234 and purports to adopt the Schering
court's exclusionary effect of the patent approach.235 In other words,
like Schering, it is not clear if Tamoxifen dictates stopping at the "ex-
clusionary" analysis or if there is still a place for the rule of reason.
Thus, all told, the divergence between approaches goes beyond
merely the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits today, but nevertheless re-
mains just as muddled. Except for the Sixth Circuit, the balance of the
cases discussed above support some form of comparison between ex-
clusionary potential of a settlement agreement versus the exclusionary
potential of the patent before condemning the agreement as an anti-
trust violation.236 However, those opinions seem to disagree mark-
edly as to whether, and to what extent, the traditional antitrust
analytical schemes can or should come into play after such compari-
son. Also, one cannot minimize Posner's holding in Asahi, because
"[f]or decades Judge Posner's jurisprudence has had a substantial im-
pact on the development of antitrust law."'237 As David Balto, former
policy director for the Federal Trade Commission stated: "[w]hile
many of the elements of [the] decision were only decided in dicta, the
reasoning [in Asahi] will probably be looked to by the courts as wel-
come guidance in this contentious area. '238 In short, the antitrust im-
plications of patent settlement agreements remains very much in flux
between jurisdictional lines.
B. Lessons Learned: How to Potentially Avoid an
Antitrust Roadblock
At first blush, one might be inclined, especially after reading the
foregoing summary of the case law, to avoid patent settlement agree-
ments that might fall under the per se flag. Indeed, it can be a scary
proposition for any practitioner to craft a settlement agreement de-
signed to protect the client's interests and yet be uncertain of its per-
severance. Moreover, with the changing face of the Supreme Court in
the Chief Justice Roberts era, one cannot be sure whether the Su-
234. Id. at 206.
235. Id. at 212. Hovenkamp suggests that the Second Circuit found exclusion payments "per
se legal" unless the underlying lawsuit is a "sham," but this may be a far reach. Hovenkamp
Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-49.
236. See also Coleman, supra note 221, at 276-77 (finding that, unlike the Sixth Circuit, "most
tribunals have considered the purpose and actual effect of an infringement settlement agree-
ment." (emphasis added)).
237. Balto, supra note 51, at 171.
238. Id.
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preme Court will follow the Second/Eleventh Circuit's "exclusion-
ary"-oriented approach or the Sixth Circuit's strict antitrust
approach.239
Nonetheless, these cases, along with recent commentators, provide
some guidance as to viable approaches for drafting and/or defending
patent settlement agreements that might otherwise offend antitrust
sensibilities. Although there is no "right" answer until the Supreme
Court weighs in, the following represents a few of the techniques one
might explore:
1. Use "Noerr-Pennington" Immunity to Avoid Antitrust Liability
Using a clearly defined antitrust immunity doctrine could be the
fastest and most efficient way to avoid the application of antitrust law
altogether. Accordingly, some commentators have noted, "parties
have attempted to use the Noerr doctrine to immunize patent litiga-
tion settlements from antitrust attack. '240 Generally, "[t]he Noerr-
Pennington immunity is a First Amendment-based doctrine that pro-
tects private parties from liability under the Sherman Act in connec-
tion with efforts to petition for anticompetitive legislation. '24' To put
it another way, under this doctrine, "a defendant is immune from
Sherman Act liability for concerted efforts to petition government to
pass legislation which has the effect of restraining or monopolizing
trade in favor of the defendant. '242 Here, a defendant could argue
that, since a settlement arises from a judicial proceeding, the agree-
ment reached should be immune under Noerr (i.e., they are "petition-
ing"). 243 However, while such an argument may be potentially
availing, at least one recent commentator has found that "such argu-
ments have not yet been accepted by the courts. '244 Thus, a Noerr
239. The Supreme Court denied certiorari to Valley Drug, Cardizem, and Schering). See dis-
cussion infra Part IV and text accompanying notes.
240. Mark L. Kovner, et al., Applying the Noerr Doctrine to Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements,
71 ANTITRUST L. J. 609, 623 (2003).
241. Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 233 (2d Cir. 2004).
242. Andrx Pharm. v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2005).
243. Kovner, et al., supra note 241, at 623.
244. Id. See also Balto & wolman, supra note 68, at 74-5 (noting that, while some courts have
accepted Noerr arguments, others have found that settlements between private parties may be
subject to antitrust challenges). See also Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Prof. Real Est. Inves-
tors, Inc., 944 F.2d 1525, 1528 (9th Cir. 1991), affd, 508 U.S. 49 (1993) (holding that "(a) decision
to accept or reject an offer of settlement is conduct incidental to the prosecution of the suit" and
therefore immune under Noerr); accord Balto & Wolman, supra note 16, at 468 n.486. Addition-
ally, in one recent case from the Eleventh Circuit, a Noerr argument was indeed successful, but
did not immunize the settlement agreement at issue. See Andrx Pharm., 421 F.3d at 1234 (hold-
ing defendant immune under Noerr for infringement suit against alleged infringer when the pat-
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approach could be a practicable first line of defense, but should be
used with caution.
2. Focus on The Nature of the Agreement: Interim Versus Final
The extent to which a client's settlement did not completely settle
the patent dispute may also play an important role in a future antitrust
case. The Eleventh Circuit's Schering decision was quick to differenti-
ate itself from Terazosin, noting that the district court in Terazosin had
applied the per se rule because the settlement agreement being re-
viewed did not finally resolve the dispute (i.e., it was an "interim"
settlement). 245 However, in Schering, the parties fully resolved the
dispute with the agreement (i.e., it was a final settlement that disposed
of the litigation). 246 The Eleventh Circuit called this distinction both
"material" and "critical" to the approach it adopted, under which it
upheld the settlement agreement being reviewed. 247 Other "final"
agreements discussed include the Zenith agreement in Valley Drug,248
the Bayer/Barr agreement in Cipro,249 and the Zeneca/Barr agree-
ment in Tamoxifen250 - all of which did not garner per se scrutiny and
were upheld by their respective courts. Also, although one cannot be
sure of the Supreme Court's reason for denying certiorari to
Cardizem, the Solicitor General argued against reviewing that case be-
cause the Sixth Circuit's opinion could fairly be read as applying the
per se rule only to "interim" settlement agreements. 251 Thus, it is ap-
parent that drafters of patent settlement agreements should at a mini-
mum craft these agreements as fully resolving the dispute rather than
as an interim agreement that only temporarily settles the case.
3. Spotlight Public Policy Considerations
Another useful argument in an antitrust suit involving a patent set-
tlement agreement requires the proponent to focus on public policy.
Dispute settlement agreements are encouraged in our legal system.252
ent holder had already settled with another alleged infringer and granted a license for the patent
at issue).
245. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1064-65 (11th Cir. 2005). See also
supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text.
246. See Schering, 402 F.3d at 1064-65. See also supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text.
247. See Schering, 402 F.3d at 1064-65, 1066 n.14. See also supra notes 140-142 and accompa-
nying text.
248. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
250. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 214 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that
the agreement at issue "ended all litigation between Zeneca and Barr.").
251. See infra notes 393-395 and accompanying text.
252. See Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-4.
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Scholars and courts alike agree that judges should favor settlements as
a matter of sound public policy because settlements conserve time and
limit expensive litigation.2 53 Along these lines, one recent commenta-
tor asserted that the rule of reason test better balances three different
public policy interests - "fostering innovation, competition, and the
consensual resolution of disputes. '254 This argument mirrors the 2003
reasoning in Cipro, where the Eastern District of New York found the
rule of reason best provided the flexibility needed to compare the
competing policies behind patent and antitrust law.255 Similarly, an-
other observer has said that public policy must "take into account and
balance all three relevant social policies - pro-competition, pro-pat-
ent, and pro-settlement - and formulate rules leading to the lowest
net social cost when all relevant costs are factored. ' 25 6 Since the per
se approach is not a balancing test and does not take into account
these policies, adopting the per se rule "would be overinclusive, pro-
scribing far more actions than required by the principles of
antitrust. "257
Furthermore, Judge Posner in Asahi noted that "[t]he general policy
of the law is to favor the settlement of litigation, and the policy ex-
tends to the settlement of patent infringement suits. '25 8 The Eleventh
Circuit in Schering held that "[t]here is no question that settlements
provide a number of private and social benefits as opposed to the in-
veterate and costly effects of litigation. ' 259 In the 2005 Cipro case, the
Eastern District of New York found that "[r]equiring parties to a law-
suit to either litigate or negotiate a settlement in the public interest...
is, as a practical matter, tantamount to establishing a rule requiring
litigants to continue to litigate when they would prefer to settle and to
act as unwilling private attorneys general and to bear the various costs
and risks of litigation. ' 260 Finally, in Tamoxifen, the Second Circuit
said that, "[w]here a case is complex and expensive, and resolution of
253. Speed Shore Corp. v. Woudenberg Enter., 605 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1979). Accord
O'Rourke & Brodley, supra note 49, at 1773 ("The law generally favors settlements because they
conserve public administrative and judicial resources ... "). See also Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan
Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir. 1976) ("[slettlement agreements should ... be upheld when-
ever equitable and policy considerations permit").
254. See Coleman, supra note 221, at 277.
255. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 267-57
(E.D.N.Y. 2003).
256. Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust
Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747, 750 (2002).
257. Reed, supra note 45, at 479-80.
258. Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 (N.D. III. 2003).
259. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11th Cir. 2005).
260. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 532 (E.D.N.Y
2005) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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the case will benefit the public, the public has a strong interest in set-
tlement. The trial court must protect the public interest, as well as the
interests of the parties, by encouraging the most fair and efficient
resolution." 261
However, public policy may only get a questionable patent settle-
ment agreement so far. According to the Supreme Court, only settle-
ments of infringement proceedings involving legitimately conflicting
patent claims are favored.262 Where the purpose of a settlement is not
to resolve a bona fide patent dispute but to exclude a mutual competi-
tor of the settling parties, the settlement may be subject to antitrust
scrutiny.263 Thus, while a settlement's favored status might be given
some credence in later antitrust review, a patent settlement with ex-
tensive antitrust baggage may not necessarily escape unscathed. 264
4. Focus on the Patent's "Exclusionary Potential"
Finally, the most viable argument attorneys have in defending pat-
ent settlement agreements is focusing the court's attention on the "ex-
clusionary potential" of the patent as compared to the settlement
agreement. As Professor Hovenkamp asserted, "most licenses that
limit output or divide markets are lawful if the underlying IP rights
are valid and infringed, since the owner of a valid IP right would have
the right to prevent the licensee from selling into the market at all."'265
Moreover, while some agreements may "create clear competitive
harms.. ." Hovenkamp believes "[t]hose competitive harms are toler-
able if - but only if - they are part of the supracompetitive return
the government has granted to an IP owner under a social policy de-
signed to encourage innovation. '266
261. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting
United States v. Glen Falls Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853, 856-57 (2d Cir. 1998)).
262. See Standard Oil v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 170-71 (1931).
263. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 199-200 (1963).
264. See Coleman, supra note 221, at 264.
265. Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-27. However, Hovenkamp also cautions that "if
a licensee could have produced a noninfringing substitute, but chose to enter into an arrange-
ment with the patentee to divide markets, cartel concerns are heightened." Id. at 7-27 n.34.
266. Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-27 (emphasis added). Hovenkamp does not to
define the term "supracompetitive." The Cipro court also uses the term, opining that "charging
supracompetitive prices [is] at the core of the patentee's rights." In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochlo-
ride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 540 (E.D.N.Y 2005) (citation omitted). Unfortunately,
Black's Law Dictionary does not contain the term either, at least as the Cipro court or
Hovenkamp are using it. However, the phrase "supra" is Latin for "above," see BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, 8th ed. (2004), so a fair reading of the phrase "supracompetitive" would be activi-
ties that appear as not competitive (e.g., charging prices above what one would consider compet-
itive). In other words, since the government grants the patentee under the Patent Act to what
amounts to a legal (i.e., permissible or tolerable) monopoly, the patentee can charge whatever
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Accordingly, a court following the Second and Eleventh Circuits
might be inclined to compare the exclusionary potential of the patent
against the settlement agreement before turning to the typical anti-
trust analysis methods.2 67 The same court might also focus on the ex-
clusionary potential comparison alone without ever getting into
traditional antitrust law.2 68 Either way, as long as the exclusionary
potential of a client's settlement is not broader than the patent's ex-
clusionary potential, the agreement might survive - at least in the
Eleventh (and now Second) Circuit anyway.2 69 Assuming a court is
willing to entertain such an argument, what does "exclusionary poten-
tial" mean exactly? The "reverse payment" cases and commentators
have shown three paths to explore.
a. Patent Validity
The extent to which a patent may be found invalid might be deter-
minative of its "exclusionary potential," but a court may decide not to
separately assess patent validity in an antitrust case. For example, the
Eastern District of New York in Cipro extensively reviewed Valley
Drug, Cardizem, Asahi, and Schering to determine whether "the ex-
clusionary power of the patent for the purposes of the anti-competi-
tive effects analysis should be tempered by its potential invalidity. '270
From a practical standpoint, this would seem logical - a patent can
only exclude others if it is a valid patent. If it is found invalid, the
patent is then, at an abstract level, no longer a patent and thus loses its
power to legally exclude under the Patent Act. However, the Cipro
court found that, "[a]lthough those courts have come to different con-
clusions regarding the legality of [reverse] payments at issue in those
cases, they have generally agreed that an antitrust court need not
make an independent assessment of the underlying patent's valid-
ity. '271 Similarly, the Court also held it would be inappropriate "to
discount the exclusionary power of the patent by any probability that
the [patent might later be] found invalid. '272 Instead, "[s]uch an in-
he desires, leaving "market forces [alone to] impose some limits on the prices a patentee can
charge." Cipro, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 540. Thus, as Hovenkamp apparently uses the term here, the
patentee's ability to act in a manner "above" what would be competitive in the market is part of
a trade off (the return) inherent in patent law's social policy designed to encourage innovation
by protecting a patentee's efforts from would be copycats.
267. See Valley Drug v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003).
268. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005).
269. See Schering, 402 F.3d 1064; Cipro, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 541, 548; In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 212, 213 n.27 (2d Cir. 2006).
270. Cipro, 363 F. Supp. 2d. at 524-30.
271. Id. at 524 (emphasis added).
272. Id. at 539 (emphasis added).
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quiry would undermine any certainty for patent litigants seeking to
settle their disputes. '273 This reasoning is also persuasive - there
might be no advantage to settlement if resolving a potential antitrust
challenge would require diving headlong into the patent litigation that
the parties sought to avoid in the first place. Thus, the Court held that
it would not conduct an "after-the-fact" validity inquiry in a settled
case, and instead the only inquiry would be "whether the Agreements
constrained competition beyond the scope of the patent claims." 274
The Second Circuit essentially approved this approach in Tamoxifen,
holding that it would not judge a "post-trial, pre-appeal settlement on
the basis of the likelihood vel non of [the patent holder's] success had
it not settled but rather pursued its appeal. '275 Instead, the Second
Circuit opted to "embrace the general rule that [courts should] ordi-
narily refrain from guessing what a [different] court will hold or would
have held. '276
Along these lines, some pundits maintain that "[d]etermining patent
validity in an antitrust proceeding would greatly complicate antitrust
litigation" because, inter alia: (1) "[t]he enforcement agencies [i.e., the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission] lack exper-
tise in patents," and (2) "antitrust judges may be reluctant to second-
guess how a patent court might rule in a pending infringement
case. ' 277 While this may be true for the agencies, both the Patent Act
and the Sherman Act are federal causes of action, so there is no such
thing as an "antitrust judge" or a "patent court" - at least not at the
federal district level. 278 But, there still could be reluctance at the ap-
pellate level, as only the Federal Circuit hears patent infringement
cases on appeal.279 Even still, other scholars assert that "[p]roving
that the pioneer would prevail in an infringement action neither com-
ports with a patent's statutory presumption of validity, nor with the
judicial clear and convincing evidence standard required to invalidate
an issued patent. '280
Yet, recall that the Terazosin court held that, because the patent
was likely to be held invalid, the settlement agreement exceeded the
273. Id. at 530.
274. Id. at 539-40
275. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation,. 466 F.3d 187, 203 (2d Cir. 2006).
276. Id. at 204.
277. O'Rourke & Brodley, supra note 49, at 1783-84.
278. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question original jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (patent
case original jurisdiction).
279. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (appellate jurisdiction for the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals). Of
course, the Supreme Court is next in line.
280. Jenkins, supra note 63, at 304.
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patent's scope. 281 Several commentators have also endorsed this ap-
proach, arguing that assessing the exclusionary value of a patent
should involve at least some form of validity inquiry.28 2 In short, the
extent to which a patent may be found invalid may be determinative
of its exclusionary potential, if validity is considered at all.283
b. Patent Terms
If the court decides not to separately assess a patent's validity,
where does that decision leave our definition of "exclusionary poten-
tial"? Generally speaking, the right of a patent holder to exclude
others from using his or her invention is also found within the patent's
"claims," which are "determined in large part through a patentee's
written description, as limited by existing prior art, novelty, and obvi-
ousness limitations. '2 84 In other words, the "exclusionary potential"
of a patent - the patent's innate ability to exclude others except for
the patent holder - is found within the terms of the patent itself.285
As such, if the patent terms would have allowed the patent holder to
281. See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1296-1310
(S.D. Fla. 2005). See also supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
282. See Crane, supra note 45, at 698-99 (asserting IP settlement agreements, at least in the
reverse payment context, "should not be accorded per se treatment under the antitrust laws and
should be approved so long as the patentee has a strong ex ante likelihood of succeeding on the
merits of its infringement claim and thereby excluding the infringing use from the market.");
Hovenkamp, et al., supra note 2, at 1759 (proposing that reverse payments be "presumptively
unlawful," to only be rebutted by the "infringement plaintiff' showing, inter alia, "the ex ante
likelihood of prevailing in its infringement lawsuit"). Accord Remarks of R. Hewitt Pate, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Justice Department, Address at the Ameri-
can Intellectual Property Law Association: Antitrust & Intellectual Property (Jan. 24, 2003),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200701.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) (not-
ing Justice Department policy as of 2003 that "[i]f a patent is valid and infringed, then any com-
petitive entry allowed by a settlement is up to the patent holder."). Cf O'Rourke & Brodley,
supra note 49, at 1781-1787 (agreeing that what makes reverse payments suspicious is their po-
tential for invalidity, but asserting that a rule of presumptive illegality will provide an incentive
for parties to enter into more procompetitive settlements and that a direct determination of
validity would consequently not be needed).
283. The Cipro court acknowledges Terazosin as the one "possible exception" to the general
rule that patent a patent validity analysis is inappropriate. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochlo-
ride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 (E.D.N.Y 2005). For an in-depth article on the
tension between patent validity and antitrust law, see generally Christopher R. Leslie, The An-
ticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101 (2006). Leslie con-
cludes that "neither patent law or antitrust law is up to the task of deterring and punishing
monopolists who maintain market power through the possession of invalid patents." Id. at 183.
284. See Aljalian, supra note 15, at 16, 25-6.
285. See Terazosin, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1297 ("The legal scope of [a patent] is measured by its
numbered claims."). See also Valley Drug v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th Cir.
2003) (holding that the "precise terms of the [patent] grant define the limits of a patentee's
monopoly and the area in which the patentee is freed from competition of price, service, quality,
or otherwise" and quoting United States v. Line Material, 300 U.S. 287, 300 (1948)).
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exclude the alleged infringer even without settlement agreement, the
agreement ought to withstand an "exclusionary potential" analysis.
Schering is an excellent example of such a case. There, the Elev-
enth Circuit noted that, "[e]ngrafted into the patent law is the notion
that a patent grant 'bestows the right to exclude others from profiting
by the patented invention.' ,,286 The Court also noted some important
policy arguments regarding the "delicate balance" between the anti-
trust and patent regulatory schemes, saying the "application of anti-
trust law to markets affected by the exclusionary statutes set forth in
the patent law cannot discount the rights of the patent holder. 287
From this, the Court concluded "a patent holder does not incur anti-
trust liability when it chooses to exclude others from producing its
patented work. '288
Turning once again to the facts of the case, the Court noted that, by
virtue of its patent right, Schering had obtained the legal right to ex-
clude Upsher and ESI from the market until either proved the pat-
ent's invalidity or that their respective products were not infringing.
289
In short, the Court determined that the patent's description was broad
enough to exclude the competitors because the patent's scope "gave
Schering the lawful right to exclude infringing products from the mar-
ket" until the patent's expiration.29° Additionally, the evidence
showed that Upsher and ESI could not have entered into the market
before the patent's expiration without infringing, which "reinforce[d]
the validity and strength of the patent."291
However, since patent law does not allow the patent holder to ex-
tend his or her "monopoly beyond the statutory right to exclude," the
Schering court turned its attention to the scope of the settlement
agreements. 292 The Court looked at whether a $60 million payment to
Upsher was not a bona fide royalty payment under the licenses Scher-
ing had obtained for Upsher's product, and held Schering "had a long-
documented and ongoing interest in licensing" a product similar to
Upsher's "Niacor" product.293 Thus, the Court held the payment was
a fair price for the Upsher products rather than an attempt to extend
286. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Dawson
Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980)).
287. Schering, 402 F.3d at 1067 (emphasis added) (citing Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S.
13, 14 (1964)).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1066.
290. Id. at 1067.
291. Id. at 1068.
292. Schering, 402 F.3d at 1067.
293. Id. at 1069.
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Schering's patent monopoly, and just because the agreement also in-
cluded Upsher's entry date into the relevant market, "one cannot in-
fer that the payments were solely for the delay rather than the
licenses. "294
As to ESI, the Federal Trade Commission complained that portion
of the $30 million payment to ESI contained provisions for legal fees
and a payment contingent of FDA approval, unlike the Upsher agree-
ment where the entire payment was supposedly for licensing of Up-
sher's products.295 In response, the Court noted "[t]hat parties to a
patent dispute may exchange consideration to settle their litigation
has been endorsed by the Supreme Court. '296 The Court also held
that "[p]atent owners should not be in a worse position, by virtue of
the patent right, to negotiate and settle surrounding lawsuits." 297 Ac-
cordingly, the Court found that, since ESI could not have entered into
the market before the expiration of Schering's patent, "this [was] not
the case of a 'naked payment' aimed to delay the entry of a product
that [was] 'legally ready and able to compete with Schering.' ",298
The recent Tamoxifen decision is further applicable to an "exclu-
sionary potential" argument. There, the Second Circuit held the set-
tlement agreement at issue "did not extend the patent monopoly by
restraining the introduction or marketing of unrelated or non-infring-
ing products. '299 Instead, "Zeneca's tamoxifen patent [was] not a for-
mulation patent, which covers only specific formulations or delivery
methods of compounds; rather, it [was] a patent on a compound that,
by its nature, excludes all generic versions of the drug. ' '3°° Thus, since
all generic versions of the drug would infringe on Zeneca's patent, the
settlement agreement, by merely excluding the manufacture of one
generic version, did not violate the Sherman Act and was within the
patent's exclusionary potential. 30 1
What can reasonably be taken from Schering and Tamoxifen is as
follows: courts that decide to look beyond a patent's potential invalid-
ity may look to the scope of the patent claims. If, under the patent
294. Id. at 1071.
295. Id. at 1071-72.
296. Id. at 1072 (citing Standard Oil, 283 U.S. 163 (1931)).
297. Schering, 402 F.3d at 1072.
298. Id. at 1072 (quoting from FTC's arguments).
299. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation,. 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006). Recall
that the Second Circuit also purposefully distinguished itself from the Sixth Circuit's Cardizem
decision, insofar as the problematic agreement in that case "included not only a substantial re-
verse payment but also an agreement that the generic manufacturer would not market non-
infringing products." Id. at 213-14.
300. Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
301. Id.
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claims alone, the patent holder could have legally excluded the com-
petitor from the market, then any settlement agreement, no matter
what the payment structure is, ought to be upheld. If the settlement
agreement goes beyond that patent's scope - i.e., the agreement al-
lows the patent holder to exclude a competitor when the holder could
not have done so under the patent terms or the agreement extends the
patent monopoly period - then that settlement agreement has gone
beyond the "exclusionary potential" of the patent and is in jeopardy.
c. Analysis of Professor Hovenkamp's Take on
"Exclusionary Potential"
Professor Hovenkamp seems to implicitly endorse the "exclusion-
ary potential" approach. He believes that "the traditional 'rule of rea-
son' analysis is not a good fit for settlement agreements that would be
unlawful per se but for the presence of an IP claim. ' 30 2 To explain
why, he reminds us that the rule of reason is a balancing test that
considers whether an agreement is more anticompetitive than any off-
setting pro-competitive benefits - i.e., "whether the agreement yields
lower or higher marketwide output. ' 30 3 In simpler terms, "[t]he rule
of reason is designed to assess whether a practice tends to diminish
marketwide output. '' 3°4 In contrast, Hovenkamp believes the problem
of an agreement that would be unlawful per se but for the presence of
an IP claim involves, inter alia, "the likely validity and scope of the
claimed IP rights. ' 30 5 Consequently, he asserts such cases should be
disposed of "on IP grounds" alone since the agreements would be
procompetitive if the patent were valid and infringed. 30 6 Using his
example:
[Sluppose that two competitors in a patent dispute reach a [settle-
ment] agreement. Under the settlement agreement the infringe-
ment plaintiff gives the infringement defendant a license to practice
the disputed technology east of the Mississippi, while reserving to
itself the right to practice the technology west of the Mississippi.
[Without] integration of operations [between] the firms .... this
agreement would be a per se unlawful naked territorial division in
the absence of an IP dispute. At the same time, however, it would
302. Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-10. Conversely, Professor Hovenkamp believes
patent settlement agreements should qualify for rule of reason treatment generally "when they
involve competitors but create only non-exclusive rights" because nonexclusive rights allow for
production outside the settlement agreement and therefore do not cause output below competi-
tive levels, especially if the agreement allows for sublicensing. Id. at 7-14 and 7-14 n.21.
303. See Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-11.
304. Id. at 7-10.
305. Id. at 7-10.
306. Id.
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be a completely legal license of a patent, because the Patent Act
expressly provides that a patentee may make territorially restricted
licenses. 30 7
In such a case, Hovenkamp instructs there would be no point to a
rule of reason analysis since that test looks for output reducing agree-
ments, whereas such an agreement is presumptively output increasing
since the patent holder could have rightfully excluded the other party
within its IP rights.308 As such, Hovenkamp asserts "[a]ntitrust's rule
of reason cannot help with that IP inquiry. '30 9 This would hold true
not just for agreements that restrict territory but also price restricted
licenses 310 or production (i.e., output) limits, 31 1 both of which are part
of a patent holder's rights under the Patent Act.312 Therefore,
Hovenkamp's approach here could be seen as in line with the Elev-
enth Circuit's opinion in Schering, which says both the per se rule and
the rule of reason are "ill-suited for an antitrust analysis of patent
cases because they seek to determine whether the challenged conduct
had an anticompetitive effect on the market" and "[t]he anticompeti-
tive effect is already present" for patents.313
On the other hand, Hovenkamp would probably only agree to the
applicability of the Schering approach to patent settlement agree-
307. Id. at 7-12, 7-13. But see Balto & Wolman, supra note 16, at 438 ("On occasion, territo-
rial restrictions in licenses have been struck down where the licensing agreements itself was seen
by the courts as a sham or pretext for implementing a market division scheme between
competitors.").
308. Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-13.
309. Id. at 7-10.
310. See Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-12 n.11 (noting that the Supreme Court has
"held that a patentee could license a competitor subject to a restriction on the price the competi-
tor would charge for goods embodying the patent."). But see Balto & Wolman, supra note 16, at
439 ("There is considerable uncertainty regarding the circumstances when price restrictions will
be considered antitrust violations.").
311. See Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-28 ("Production limits should generally be
treated in the same way [as territory restricted licenses], because inherent in the concept of a
license is the right to license a specific amount."). See also Balto & Wolman, supra note 16, at
440-41 (asserting that "... the courts have generally held that provisions in patent licenses that
restrict the quantity of patented articles produced by the licenser are lawful. There is a split of
authority, however, as to whether the patent grant protects a patentee who includes a provision
in a patent license that limits the quantity of unpatented products produced by the patented
apparatus.").
312. See also Hovenkamp, et al., supra note 2, at 1749 (asserting that "price- and output re-
stricted licenses are generally illegal in the absence of a valid IP right, but generally legal where
such a right exists.").
313. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065-66 (11th Cir. 2005). This is not to
suggest that Hovenkamp actually agrees with the Eleventh Circuit. He feels the Schering deci-
sion gives too much deference to the Patent & Trademark office ("PTO"), as the validity of
patents should always be an issue and not left to presumptive validity. See Hovenkamp Treatise,
supra note 2, at 7-46. He also notes that, while the decision serves the interests of judical econ-
omy, it ignores "the competitive realities" of the case. Id. at 7-47.
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ments beyond the "reverse payment" context. He maintains that re-
verse payment agreements are, "[i]nsofar as antitrust is concerned,
among the most problematic settlement agreements. .. ,314 because
"there is no plausible procompetitive reason to enter into such an
agreement." 315 Instead, these types of agreements are particularly
irksome for Hovenkamp, because "[o]ne can easily give reasons why
exclusion payments are anticompetitive: they invoke a government
regulation to exclude all competitors from a market, even in circum-
stances where entry would be likely absent the payments. ' 316 As
such, he supports the Sixth Circuit's position of "presumptive illegal-
ity" for such payments.317 However, Hovenkamp would make any
payment from a patentee to an infringement defendant "presump-
tively unlawful" unless the patentee shows both: "(1) that the ex ante
likelihood of prevailing in its infringement lawsuit is significant, and
(2) that the size of the payment is no more than the expected value of
litigation and collateral costs attending the lawsuit. '318 Fortunately,
this is a rebuttable presumption but it still puts the patentee under the
gun.
But, Hovenkamp is not without his critics in this regard, chief
among them being Judge Posner in Asahi.319 As Posner notes, a "pay-
ment" does not have to involve money.320 Virtually any settlement
agreement with consideration going from holder to infringer may be
viewed as a "reverse payment" to the defendant "who would not set-
tle unless he had something to show for the settlement. ... " 321 Thus,
to call such settlements presumptively illegal would mean certain
death for patent settlements all together. 322 However, fairly read with
his other conclusions in this area, it appears that Hovenkamp prefers
presumptive illegality only in the "novel" area of pharmaceutical in-
dustry reverse payments,323 but would accept an "exclusionary poten-
tial" approach for other types of patent settlement agreements.
314. Hovenkamp, et al., supra note 2, at 1749.
315. Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-43.
316. Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, & Mark A. Lemley, Balancing Ease and Accuracy
in Assessing Pharmaceutical Exchsion Payments, 88 MINN. L. REv. 712, 718 (2004).
317. Id. at 712. Hovenkamp also approves of the dissents' arguments in Tamoxifen. See
Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-50.
318. Hovenkamp, et al., supra note 2, at 1759.
319. See Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. I11.
2003). See also supra notes 161-166 and accompanying text. For further criticism on
Hovenkamp's approach to reverse payments, see generally Crane, supra note 45.
320. Asahi, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 994.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See Hovenkamp, supra note 34, at 24.
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Yet, even if the case did not involve reverse payments, Hovenkamp
would not let a patent dispute settlement go without at least some
examination of its potential anticompetitive effects; just not as exten-
sively as the rule of reason mandates. Rather, he proposes the follow-
ing test: "once conduct is found that would likely be an antitrust
violation in the absence of a settlement, some care must be taken to
ensure (1) that the parties did have a bona fide dispute, (2) the settle-
ment is a reasonable accommodation, and (3) that the settlement is
not more anticompetitive than the likely outcome of the litigation. '324
This test might be viewed favorably in future antitrust cases, as the
district court on remand from Valley Drug used this test when it
lacked guidance from the appellate court.32 5
Both the Supreme Court and Judge Posner support the first part of
Hovenkamp's test. In Asahi, Posner held that "[o]nly if a patent set-
tlement is a device from circumventing antitrust law is it vulnerable to
an antitrust suit." 32 6 Similarly, the Supreme Court has said that where
a settlement's purpose is not to resolve a bona fide patent dispute but
to exclude a mutual competitor of the parties to the agreement, the
settlement should be subjected to antitrust scrutiny.327 However, Pos-
ner also instructed that, under Supreme Court precedent, "a suit
charging sham litigation as a method of monopolization must fail un-
less the litigation is objectively baseless," which means that subjective
intent to harm or even hostility towards competitors is immaterial. 328
Posner also held that "[i]t is not 'bad faith' ... to assert patent rights
that one is not certain will be upheld in a suit for infringement pressed
to judgment and to settle the suit to avoid risking the loss of the
rights." 329 Even if the patent holder is not confident in the validity of
his patent, the Patent Act gives all patents a presumption of validity
and entitles the patent holder to defend that validity in court.330 Thus,
a settlement along these lines should be upheld "unless a neutral ob-
server would reasonably think either that the patent was almost cer-
tain to be declared invalid, or the defendants were almost certain to be
found not to have infringed it, if the suit went to judgment. '331 So,
324. Hovenkamp, et al., supra note 2, at 1727; accord Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-
10.
325. See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1295(S.D.
Fla. 2005). See also supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
326. Asahi, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 991.
327. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 199-200 (1963).
328. Asahi, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 993 (emphasis supplied and citing Prof'l Real Estate Investors,
Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993)).
329. Asahi, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 993.
330. Id. at 992-93 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2007)).
331. Id. at 993 (emphasis added).
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according to Posner, as long as there is a "colorable infringement
claim," the infringement suit should not be viewed as an "anticompeti-
tive measure. '332 The Second Circuit has essentially sided with Pos-
ner, holding ".. .so long as the patent litigation is neither a sham nor
otherwise baseless, the patent holder is seeking to arrive at a settle-
ment in order to protect that to which it is presumably entitled: a law-
ful monopoly over the manufacture and distribution of the patented
product. ' 333 This standard gives settling parties considerable wiggle
room.
The second and third parts of Professor Hovenkamp's test are prob-
lematic however. Restating these elements somewhat differently in
the same article, Hovenkamp stated that ". . .the settlement agree-
ment must be within the range of likely outcomes of litigation, or no
more anticompetitive than such an outcome would have been. '334
The "likely" outcome of a trial is hard to predict and is thus a vague
review standard. Generally speaking, a "likely" outcome of any pat-
ent infringement litigation is one that does not exceed the remedies
allowable under the Patent Act, which include continued exclusion of
competitors for the remaining patent term as well as further injunctive
and monetary relief if the patent holder prevails. 335 Thus, it naturally
follows that a patent dispute settlement agreement should not exceed
these remedies without running afoul of the Sherman Act. This is just
another way of saying that the agreement should not exceed the
power that the patent gives that patentee, and is not inapposite to an
"exclusionary potential" analysis.
Beyond this however, it is difficult to conceive of an agreement that
is not within the "likely" range of outcomes of the litigation but still
within the bounds of the Patent Act. One form of agreement that
comes to mind is a reverse payment. A reverse payment agreement is
not what one would expect as the "likely" outcome of litigation, but
such agreements are not prohibited anywhere in the Patent Act. If
the patentee prevailed and the patent was deemed valid and infringed,
332. Id. at 995.
333. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation,. 466 F.3d 187, 208-09 (2d Cir. 2006).
334. Hovenkamp, et al., supra note 2, at 1734 (emphasis added).
335. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2007) (outlining the general rights of a patent holder, in-
cluding "the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling" the pat-
ented product for a term of 20 years); 35 U.S.C. §283 (2007) (providing for further injunctive
relief that the court deems "reasonable"); 35 U.S.C. §284 (2007) (providing for damages ade-
quate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the
use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court);
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2007) (providing that, in an exceptional case, the court may award attorney fees
to the prevailing party).
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he would get damages and other relief.336 The middle ground result
would be settlement where, in Hovenkamp's words, "probably the
most common outcome ... is some type of agreement in which the
infringement defendant pays a fee to the infringement plaintiff for a
license coupled with some restrictions on the production or sale of the
patented article. ' 337 Conversely, if the patent holder lost and the pat-
ent was deemed invalid/not infringed, the patentee would be out court
fees and the other attendant costs of litigation. Thus, if the patentee
settles with the defendant for anything beyond these costs, this agree-
ment would have gone beyond the "likely" outcome of the litigation
in Hovenkamp's test. Indeed, as discussed above, Hovenkamp has
said that, if litigation costs exceed a reverse payment, the reverse pay-
ment settlement should be prohibited.338 Hovenkamp also maintains
that, "even a patentee who is one hundred percent certain that its pat-
ent will be declared valid and infringed would be willing [only] to
make a payment that is lower than anticipated litigation costs. '339
But, even conceding that reverse payments are not the usual outcome
of a trial and that a likely victor would not normally settle beyond
litigation costs, neither of these notions is universally true. As another
commentator recently noted, economically rational companies will
pay more than the costs of the litigation to settle a patent dispute,
even if they would have prevailed at trial, due to the uncertainties of
the litigation process.340 A variety of intangible factors go into settle-
ment agreements and the amounts parties are willing to pay to dispose
of a sticky litigation, and even a slam-dunk infringement case could
still end badly for the patentee. 341 Thus, considering any value ex-
changed between the parties compared to litigation costs is troubling.
Moreover, the anticompetitive effects of any settlement agreement
are less relevant, perhaps merely red herrings, if the settlement agree-
ment does not exceed the exclusionary potential of the patent. To put
it another way, recall that Schering dictates "the proper analysis of
antitrust liability [in a patent dispute settlement] requires an examina-
tion of: (1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2)
336. See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
337. Hovenkamp, supra note 34, at 23.
338. See also Hovenkamp, et al., supra note 2, at 1760.
339. Hovenkamp, supra note 34, at 25; accord Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-39 n.98
("[I]f the patentee was 100 percent sure of victory in the patent infringement suit, a settlement
payment would not exceed the expected litigation costs.").
340. See Reed, supra note 45, at 476.
341. See Cotter, supra note 48, at 1813 (asserting "absolute certainty is probably rare and
reverse payments are to be expected even when the plaintiff's probability of success is high but.
not certain.").
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the extent to which the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the
resulting anticompetitive effects. '342 (Step three is similar to the last
part of Hovenkamp's test, which states the settlement should not be
"more anticompetitive than the likely outcome of the litigation. ' 343)
Once a defendant survives elements one and two of the Schering test,
element three is arguably moot.
Take for example a basic patent for any conceivable invention, no
matter how simple. As the Cipro court aptly noted, "an exclusion of
competitors and charging of supracompetitive prices are at the core of
the patentee's rights, and are legitimate rewards of the patent monop-
oly."' 3 4 4 As part of these rights, the patentee may assign/license "to
the whole or any specified part of the United States. '345 Thus, outside
of the dispute context, the patentee is allowed, under the Patent Act,
to assign some or all of his/her patent rights, including the right to
manufacture the claimed invention, or any aspect thereof, covered
under the patent claims.346 The holder could therefore license to an-
other person the limited right to manufacture a certain number of
items under the patent, which certainly would raise antitrust red flags
as a classic "output" restriction outside of the IP context.347 However,
granting such a license would mean more competition than not, be-
cause the patent holder could simply choose not to grant the license at
all, which is also his or her right under the Patent Act.348
This also holds true within the litigation context, because "[i]f set-
tlement negotiations fail[ed] and the patentee prevail[ed] in its suit,
competition would be prevented to the same or an even greater extent
because the [competitor] could not enter the market prior to the expi-
ration of the patent. ' 349 In other words, a patent, by virtue of being a
342. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005). See also supra notes
140-145 and accompanying text.
343. Hovenkamp, et al., supra note 2, at 1727.
344. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 540 (E.D.N.Y
2005) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Again, for a likely definition of the term "supracom-
petitive," see supra note 267.
345. See 35 U.S.C. §261 (2007); accord Schering, 402 F.3d at 1066.
346. See Schering, 402 F.3d at 1067 ("A patent grant gives its owner the right to grant licenses
if it so chooses, or it may ride its wave alone until the patent expires.").
347. Of course, if you are limiting the number of items a competitor can manufacture, you are
restricting output. As discussed above, output restrictions are usually viewed as per se Sherman
Act violations, at least outside of the patent context. See supra notes 33, 44 and accompanying
text.
348. See Schering, 402 F.2d at 1056 ("Engrafted into the patent law is the notion that a patent
grant bestows 'the right to exclude others from profiting by the patented invention."' (citation
omitted)).
349. Schering, 402 F.3d at 1074; accord Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289
F.Supp.2d 986, 994 (N.D. I11. 2003).
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patent, has some anticompetitive effects on the market (i.e., allowing
the patent holder the choice of whom to license or defining how much
of a patented invention may be produced); but, a settlement agree-
ment within the scope of a patent that allows at least some production
of the patented invention as opposed to none at all is more pro-com-
petitive than anticompetitive. 350 Indeed, even Professor Hovenkamp
has said a settlement agreement is "competitively preferable to an out-
come under which the patent is declared valid and the infringement
defendant is excluded from the market altogether. '351 And, even if
the parties could have reached a more pro-competitive result than the
licensing scheme/settlement agreement employed, the Supreme Court
has essentially held that would-be challengers "have no right to sec-
ond-guess whether some different agreement would have been more
palatable. ' 352 In short, as long a competition is prevented within the
scope of the patent claims, a patent settlement agreement ought to
withstand antitrust scrutiny under the "exclusionary potential" analy-
sis, and reviewing any resulting anticompetitive effects would be a
needless exercise. 353
In sum, settlement agreement drafters and defenders should be
wary of any rights in the agreement beyond what the patent right
gives - i.e., agreements that also extend to products not covered by
the patent or agreements that delay entry into the relevant market
beyond patent expiration.354 If this line is crossed, the exclusionary
350. See Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-4 ("In an IP case, assuming a genuine dis-
pute, the outcome of a settlement agreement that would otherwise produce an antitrust violation
might be no more anticompetitive than the outcome of the underlying litigation. A judgment
establishing the validity of a rival's claim might prevent a competitor from entering the market
altogether, leaving the other with a monopoly. In such a case, a settlement that excludes the
competitor from the market would not reduce competition that would otherwise legally exist,
and a settlement involving a license even on restrictive terms would create more competition than
if the IP owner had merely enforced its rights to the fullest extent.") (emphasis added).
351. Hovenkamp, supra note 34, at 23 (emphasis added).
352. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 536 (E.D.N.Y
2005) (citing Verizon Comm'n, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 415-16
(2004)). But see Hovenkamp, et al, supra note 2, at 1727-28. ("In the face of uncertainty, the
antitrust tribunal must also consider whether the parties might have settled on alternative, less
restrictive terms."). Hovenkamp recently discussed the Trinko decision in a separate article, but
does not seem to discuss this aspect of the case and how this would affect his analytical ap-
proach. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 34.
353. However, the Tamoxifen court still looked at the resulting anti-competitive effects any-
way. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 216 (2d Cir. 2006).
354. Hovenkamp provides a useful example of when patent scope has been exceeded. To
paraphrase: suppose Ford claims that Chevrolet has infringed on its windshield wiper blade pat-
ent. The parties settle the dispute with an agreement that licenses use of design to Chevy but
also restricts Ford from selling cars west of the Mississippi River and Chevy from selling to the
east for some reason. Such a market division would be unlawful even if the patent right was
valid and infringed because enforcing the patent for the blades has nothing to do with Chevy
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effect of the settlement agreement extends beyond the exclusionary
potential of the patent claims, and thus the settlement agreement is
more than likely in antitrust jeopardy.355
C. Proposed Solution: Adopt the "Exclusionary
Potential" Approach
To resolve this issue, the Supreme Court should adopt a clear test to
eliminate any further confusion - unless the Sixth Circuit clarifies its
position in Cardizem, putting it more in line with the Eleventh Circuit
in Schering in the meantime. Nevertheless, selecting an official test
need not be an arduous task for the Supreme Court. As discussed
below, the Court could justifiably adopt the "exclusionary potential"
approach for a variety of reasons. 356
First, the Court is dealing with a systemic conflict - patent law and
antitrust law simultaneously allowing and preventing monopolies -
and it must carefully balance between competing objectives. Both re-
gimes are equally important and, barring some future legislation cre-
ating an explicit antitrust exemption in the Patent or Sherman Acts
covering patent dispute settlements, the Court must do nothing to tip
the scales. With this broad goal guiding its hand, the Court should
thus steer away from the harsh application of the per se rule because
"such a standard does not adequately take into consideration the
rights of the patent holder. ' 357 Indeed, the very language Patent Act
gives the patentee "the right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention. . .. "358 The patent right to
exclude (or for that matter any right to exclude) is inherently anticom-
petitive. 359 So, applying a rigid test that does not consider any pro-
competitive effects in spite of exclusion fails to give deference to the
essential nature of the patent right and instead seemingly favors anti-
selling cars. As such, a court could "dispose of the antitrust issue without considering that the
agreement settled an IP claim" and without having to balance the competing policies between
the two legal regimes. See Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-8.
355. See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 212-13 ("Whatever damage is done to competition by settle-
ment is done pursuant to the monopoly extended to the patent holder by patent law unless the
terms of the settlement enlarge the scope of that monopoly.").
356. In an article published contemporaneously with drafting of this Comment, Kristopher
Reed proposed adopting a form of this approach as well. See Reed, supra note 45, at 478. Reed
does not however take into account the test as articulated in Schering (at least not the 2005
version), nor does he consider any court decision after Valley Drug as part of his proposal. Nev-
ertheless, Reed's analysis appears well reasoned, and some of it has been incorporated in this
sub-section.
357. Reed, supra note 45, at 458.
358. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2007) (emphasis added).
359. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005).
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trust over patent law. In other words, "[t]he problem with the Sixth
Circuit's reasoning is that the patent itself could have the same detri-
mental effect on competition and consumer, irrespective of the settle-
ment. ' 360 Thus, the Cardizem approach should not be followed,
especially since the Eleventh Circuit's approach in Schering best pro-
vides balance to the two competing regimes as it would condemn only
those agreements that exceed the patentee's IP rights. 361
Furthermore, adopting the "exclusionary potential" approach
would not offend the lower courts' present understanding of the
proper balance between antitrust and patent law, and instead would
comport with a discernible trend. As discussed, many of the lower
courts have recently used some form of an exclusionary potential
analysis when considering the antitrust implications of patent litiga-
tion settlements. 362 Even Professor Hovenkamp, who thinks the
Cardizem decision got it right, would likely accept an official adoption
of an "exclusionary potential" analysis, at least outside of the "reverse
payment" context.363 This trend among courts and scholars endorsing
this approach, or at least some variance of it, ought to be followed to
its logical conclusion and solidified as the proper analytical scheme.
Embracing the "exclusionary potential" approach also accords with
much older patent settlement/antitrust jurisprudence. As far back as
the early 1980's, the D.C. Circuit apparently employed an analogous
approach in the U.S. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle case. 364 There, the
Court overruled the district court who had applied the per se rule
without considering the patent scope because "the very object of [the
patent law] is monopoly .... The fact that the conditions in the con-
tract keep up the monopoly does not render them illegal. ' 365 Accord-
ingly, the Court ruled that "a rule of reason rather than a per se rule"
should apply because "the protection of the patent laws and the cover-
age of the antitrust laws are not separate issues. ' 366 As such, "the
conduct at issue [would only be deemed] illegal if it threaten[ed] com-
petition in areas other than those protected by the patent.... ,,367 Ulti-
mately, the Court held the lower court in error for "consider[ing] the
scope of the patent protection irrespective of any competitive ef-
fects. . ., and then rul[ing] separately on the anticompetitive effects of
360. Reed, supra note 45, at 475.
361. See Schering, 402 F.3d at 1066.
362. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 316-324 and accompanying text.
364. U.S. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id. (emphasis added).
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the arrangement without consideration of the protection of the pat-
ent. '368 While this holding is not precisely in line with Schering since
the Eleventh Circuit explicitly said the rule of reason was inappropri-
ate in patent cases, 369 the D.C. Circuit nevertheless advocated looking
at the scope of the patent's protection before deeming the agreement
illegal under the antitrust laws - definitely an "exclusionary poten-
tial" approach.
However, many aspects of this approach require further clarifica-
tion before its official adoption. The Eleventh Circuit in Schering was
unclear whether traditional antitrust analysis can be used if a court
determines the exclusionary potential of the agreement exceeds the
exclusionary potential of the patent, as the Valley Drug decision
had. 370 Can an agreement still receive rule of reason scrutiny even if it
fails an "exclusionary potential" analysis? Both Professor
Hovenkamp and the Schering decision seem to agree that further re-
view would not be needed, 37' but even the Cipro court was not sure if
the rule of reason was being abandoned or merely refined in Scher-
ing.3 72 Additionally, although it is arguably implicit, some care should
be taken to ensure that the litigation is not a sham, which follows Pos-
ner's reasoning in Asahi as well as prior Supreme Court precedent.373
This should not be hard to accept - to have an exercisable IP exclu-
sion right, there at least should be some colorable right to start with as
opposed to a completely illusory one. Moreover, as one commentator
noted, "a provision of an agreement which may be per se unlawful in
isolation may not be enough, when part of a larger agreement, to
make the whole agreement unlawful. '374 It may be that only a por-
tion of an offensive agreement has exceeded the exclusionary scope of
the patent, and a court could merely sever the cancerous provisions
from the agreement without wholly condemning it. Finally, although
it may be a useless exercise since patents are inherently exclusionary
and anticompetitive, an examination of "the resulting anticompetitive
effects" pays proper homage to the objectives of the Sherman Act
while still considering the rights of the patent holder.375 But, the
368. Id. (emphasis added).
369. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005).
370. See supra notes 225-235 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 309-314 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 177-280 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 327-333 and accompanying text.
374. Burford, supra note 56, at 379.
375. Considering "resulting anticompetitive effects" was the third part of court's analytical
approach. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005). As dis-
cussed above, this approach may not be needed, see supra notes 342-353 and accompanying text,
but it is certainly not harmful.
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Schering opinion is not clear enough: exactly what "anticompetitive
effects" is the court concerned about (i.e., harming consumers, other
competitors, or both)? Some further guidance could clarify this issue,
but with this and the foregoing caveats, the Court should adopt the
"exclusionary potential" approach fundamentally as it appears in
Schering.
Sadly, the "exclusionary potential" approach will not be without
critics despite its seemingly abundant support. Some may argue that
"a per se approach provides attractive efficiency, avoiding a 'time-con-
suming and difficult' inquiry into the merits of any underlying intellec-
tual property rights or claims. ' 376 In contrast, the "exclusionary
potential" approach would enquire into the merits of a patent (per-
haps into validity but certainly into the patent terms), which antitrust
agencies and judges may be ill equipped or hesitant to handle. 377 Fu-
ture tribunals would have to "determine the scope of the right to ex-
clude, presumably through extensive discovery, expert analysis, and
claim construction. '378 This problem would be difficult to counteract
systemically, but special masters well versed in patent law would be
useful to pick up any slack. Moreover, the exclusionary potential ap-
proach could be seen as "inefficient and unnecessarily punishing to
valid antitrust plaintiffs. '379 Adoption of this rule might "push[ ]
every agreement into a complex, time-consuming, and extremely
costly analysis of the patent grant; essentially a district court would
have to conduct an entire patent infringement and invalidity trial
before even reaching the substantive antitrust issues. ' 380 However,
such a rule is necessary to promote fair treatment of patent holders in
antitrust cases, 381 and it might not be any more time-consuming than a
full-blown rule of reason analysis.382
IV. IMPACT
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to Cardizem
and Valley Drug, which could have clarified the divergence among the
376. Reed, supra note 45, at 479.
377. See supra note 277-279 and accompanying text. See also Reed, supra note 45, at 478
(noting that the antitrust trial ironically becomes a patent litigation, which is what the parties
wanted to avoid with the settlement agreement in the first place, under the "exclusionary poten-
tial" approach).
378. Mosier & Ritcheson, supra note 3, at 511.
379. Id. at 511.
380. Id. at 511.
381. See Reed, supra note 45, at 478.
382. See Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-14 ("Courts should have considerable discre-
tion on summary judgment to dispose of a weak case on the antitrust merits without getting into
the underlying IP issues.").
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circuits.383 The Court did not explain why it declined review (it never
does). However, the Court's lack of guidance in this area will con-
tinue to have a disparate impact on patent settlement agreements as
the lower courts decide which analytical approach to follow.
Remember, a court will apply the per se rule when it has enough
"experience to conclude that a certain class of practices is so likely to
be anticompetitive" that the more detailed rule of reason test is
thought unnecessary.384 Without clear guidance from the high court,
lower courts dealing with the antitrust implications of patent settle-
ment agreements remain free to choose when either test is appropri-
ate in a given case. The Sixth Circuit felt that, based on its
"experience," the settlement agreement in Cardizem warranted the
strict per se approach. However, the Second and Eleventh Circuits
felt otherwise and focused first on the patent itself and the attendant
IP rights rather than on traditional antitrust principles. For whatever
reason, the Supreme Court did not pick up on this and denied certio-
rari to what most pundits, including the venerable Professor
Hovenkamp, have considered a clear circuit split in need of clarity. 385
Therefore, whether a patent settlement agreement will survive anti-
trust bombardment remains jurisdiction dependent, and it would be
hard to imagine any parties - especially if their settlement involved a
dreaded "reverse payment" - preferring the Sixth Circuit over the
Eleventh or Second Circuits at this juncture.
Some of the briefs to the Supreme Court further illustrate the grav-
ity of this situation. Back in 2003, the petitioner in Cardizem correctly
foresaw that "parties to intellectual property disputes need immediate
guidance regarding whether antitrust liability may attach to their set-
tlements because it is common for intellectual property disputes to be
settled by agreements in which the infringer receives consideration in
exchange for a promise to withhold its product from the market." 386
Indeed, from Valley Drug to the recent Tamoxifen case, the contro-
versy surrounding the antitrust implications of patent settlement
agreements in the reverse payment context has continued to swell.
Three separate circuits have chimed in all with comparable but ulti-
mately contrasting approaches, and there is no clear mandate as to
which is the "correct" approach. Commentary from outside observers
383. See Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Kroger Co., et al., 125 S.Ct. 307 (2004) (denying cert. in the
Cardizem case). See also Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 125 S.Ct. 308 (2004) (denying
cert. in Valley Drug).
384. Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-11.
385. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
386. Petitioner's Brief, Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Kroger Co., et aL, 2003 WL 22867750 at *8
(Nov. 24, 2003).
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has also grown exponentially, each advocating a new approach for the
Supreme Court to adopt. All told, this flood of information from the
various viewpoints makes drafting a patent dispute settlement agree-
ment extremely difficult, as the law in this area remains blurred and
uncertain. One cannot now, in good confidence, draft a settlement
agreement for a patent dispute and then tell the client with a straight
face that the patent dispute is definitely over.
Additionally, the petitioner in Cardizem fittingly pointed to the
multidistrict nature of these cases and how this situation could be a
long-term nightmare because of a circuit split.387 Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, cases with common questions of fact can be
consolidated for pre-trial proceedings, otherwise known as a "mul-
tidistrict litigation" (more commonly known as an "MDL"). 388 Once
the pre-trial phase is over, each individual case that comprised the
consolidated MDL returns back to the district from which it
originated for further proceedings, assuming that case was not com-
pletely disposed of at the pre-trial phase. 389 So, take for example an
antitrust/patent settlement MDL where the cases involved consist of
one case originating from Florida, another from New York, and an-
other from Michigan. A federal district court in one of these states
will conduct the MDL, and your client and the MDL court are in dif-
ferent jurisdictions. Now assume that the case goes up on interlocu-
tory appeal, for which the district court submits certified questions to
the federal circuit court of appeals above it. Which antitrust approach
to patent settlements - the Second, Sixth, or Eleventh - will ulti-
mately apply in this scenario?
Such was the environment in Cardizem, but at the time of the peti-
tion, there was only a two-circuit split. Thus, the petitioner feared a
two front choice-of-law problem because its case had originated in
Florida (in the Eleventh Circuit bound by Valley Drug) but the Sixth
Circuit was answering certified questions from a Michigan district
court (the MDL court) on interlocutory appeal. 390 Does the origin
court, after the MDL has concluded, apply the law of its jurisdiction
or the law that applied for the MDL? The petitioner in Cardizem, of
course, argued Valley Drug would have to apply or the Florida district
court would face certain reversal for not following the Eleventh Cir-
387. See id. at *14
388. See 28 U.S.C. §1407(a) (2007).
389. See id.
390. See Andrx, 2003 WL 22867750 at *14-15. See also In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 332 F.3d 896, 903 (6th Cir. 2003).
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cuit.391 If petitioner's assertions in this regard were correct, the prob-
lem would today be exacerbated. If the MDL was in Michigan, the
Florida and New York defendants could be governed by the Sixth Cir-
cuit's per se approach even though the law in their own jurisdiction
takes a different path. Alternatively, even if the Florida or New York
defendants garnered an approach more akin to their home jurisdiction
(i.e., an "exclusionary potential" approach), the Michigan defendant
who might have received a favorable result in New York MDL could
return home to find that result changed. The Florida defendant could
also return home to subtle differences within its own jurisdiction. In
short, this is certainly a sticky problem that only creates further tur-
moil for settling parties.
Going further, the Solicitor General and the Federal Trade Com-
mission filed an amicus brief in Cardizem essentially agreeing with the
petitioner that it would be wrong to treat every such agreement as per
se illegal. 392 This brief proffers that "[rieverse payments may have the
salutary effect of facilitating efficient settlements that advance con-
sumer welfare" and thus should not be condemned to per se illegal-
ity.393 However, the brief also recommends against granting certiorari,
primarily because Cardizem could be read as applying the per se rule
only to "interim" agreements (i.e., not finally settling the litigation)
covering even non-infringing products.394 As discussed, this may not
be an entirely inaccurate reading of Cardizem,395 but most commenta-
tors agree there is a circuit split that needs addressing. 396
Recently, the Court had another chance to speak up, but it came
from a seemingly unlikely source - the Federal Trade Commission.
In its appeal of Schering, the FTC argued against the "exclusionary
potential" approach, asserting that "review of the ... issue is needed
not only because of disarray among the lower courts on this issue, but
because of the dramatic impact the present ruling could have on U.S.
consumers. ' 397 In other words, even though the FTC argued against
review in 2004, they changed their tune and just appealed Schering to
the Supreme Court.398 Naturally, the opposing brief picks up on this,
391. Cardizem, at 900.
392. See Amicus Brief, Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Kroger Co., et aL, 2004 WL 1562075 at *9 (July
9, 2004).
393. Id.
394. Id. at *12.
395. See supra notes 217-219 and accompanying text.
396. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
397. See Petitioner's Brief, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp. et. aL, 2005 WL 2105243 at *23
(Aug. 29, 2005).
398. Id.
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and rightly so - it is a little hard to argue there is no controversy and
turn around a year later and claim that there is.399 This change of
heart notwithstanding, the FTC's brief further reveals the impact this
circuit split is having on the law. Even the chief antitrust regulatory
agency recognized the problem and argues it is time to be addressed.
However, the Supreme Court, for whatever reason, did not grant certi-
orari in Schering. 4°° Thus, in sum, this area of law remains very much
unsettled.
V. CONCLUSION
Until the Supreme Court settles this controversy, the amount of an-
titrust scrutiny that may apply to patent settlement agreements re-
mains up to the individual courts which, thus far, have been fairly
inconsistent. The Sixth Circuit seems to favor the traditional antitrust
approach of per se illegality, whereas several other jurisdictions (most
notably the Second and Eleventh Circuits) have analyzed agreements
from an IP rights perspective but with varying methodology. The Su-
preme Court has had three chances to clarify, but for whatever reason
declined to do so. Yet this area of law is clearly under development
and in much need of guidance.
In the meantime, lawyers facing an antitrust challenge should enter-
tain several lines of defense when arguing to uphold a patent settle-
ment agreement, including: (1) that the agreement is immune from
antitrust scrutiny under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine; (2) that public
policy concerns outweigh antitrust concerns as well as favor a balanc-
ing approach; (3) that the agreement is a "final" resolution to the dis-
pute rather than an "interim" agreement; and/or (4) that the
399. See Brief in Opposition, F1C v. Schering-Plough Corp., 2005 WL 2428345 at *3 (Sept. 30,
2005).
400. See F.T.C. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 126 S.Ct. 2929 (2006). The Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari to a non-reverse payment, patent settlement case from the federal circuit.
Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted 126 S.Ct. 1329
(2006). At the appellate level, the Federal Circuit held that "[tlhe settlement of disputes such as
priority in patent interferences is not a presumptive violation of antitrust law; such a violation
requires a showing of market power and other antitrust predicates. A patent does not of itself
confer market power or a presumption thereof for the purposes of the antitrust laws." 427 F.3d
at 965-66. However, while it seems that the Federal Circuit implicitly rejects the application of
the per se rule, the Court does not discuss Cardizem, Valley Drug, or their progeny. However, as
seen in the Petition for Certiorari (2005 WL 3067195) and the oral argument transcript (2006
WL 3069259, Oct. 4, 2006), the appeal is based on a limited jurisdictional issue regarding the
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), and not patent settlement agreements. The
Supreme Court finally decided Medimmune in early 2007, but did not take up Cardizem, et al.,
which leaves the antitrust / patent settlement agreement very much unanswered for the time
being. See 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007). For Hovenkamp's take on the Medimmune case, see
Hovenkamp Treatise, supra note 2, at 7-8.1 - 8.3 and 7-55.
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agreement is within the scope or "exclusionary potential" of the pat-
ent. The third option could be a preemptive measure, whereas the last
option is of particular importance as it represents the direction the
circuit courts seem to be heading and would not be problematic for
the Supreme Court to adopt officially. Until that day, IP practitioners
must remain particularly vigilant of future antitrust complications
when resolving patent disputes through settlement agreements and
advise their clients accordingly.4 °1
401. See Coleman, supra note 221, at 286. ("Neither the pursuit nor the settlement of patent
infringement litigation is an unfettered right. Both the litigation and infringement cases should
be undertaken with sensitivity toward antitrust risks."). For more practical tips, see William H.
Rooney, New Developments in the Application of Antitrust to Patent-Holder Conduct, 858 PLI/
PAT 913, 929-30 (2006).
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